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Congress, Public Values, and the Financing of 
Private Choice  
MARY L. HEEN*
This Article examines the financing dimension of private choice, with a focus on 
Congress’s taxing and spending decision-making processes. The Article begins with 
an overview of the financing and performance dimensions of privatization 
decisions, followed by an analysis of how taxation relates to both dimensions. 
Private choice can be financed individually, that is, paid for by an individual’s own 
resources, facilitated by general tax reduction. Alternatively, private choice can be 
financed collectively by using tax revenues (or borrowed funds) to pay for privately 
provided goods and services.  The tendency in political debate to conflate those two 
forms of financing, as well as the failure to distinguish between financing and 
performance, obscures important decisions about private choice and the 
government’s role in managing or monitoring collectively financed activities. 
Congress coordinates its taxing and spending decisions through the budget process, 
collectively determining what will be financed and performed through government 
and what will be left to private choice. The courts generally defer to the taxing and 
spending decisions made by Congress. Nevertheless, in the process of developing 
this highly deferential approach, the U.S. Supreme Court historically has drawn 
distinctions between taxes and other means of paying for or regulating the 
production of goods and services. Although it can be quite difficult to distinguish 
“taxes” or “revenue raising” from “user fees,” “prices,” or “penalties,” they are 
not constitutionally interchangeable. When the Court has interpreted express 
limitations on Congress’s taxing power, it has drawn distinctions similar to those 
drawn in the privatization literature between individual and collective financing. 
These doctrinal distinctions reflect the democratic values inherent in Congress’s 
taxing and spending powers. 
Next, drawing from tax scholarship on tax expenditures, the Article develops the 
argument that general tax reduction and targeted tax incentives differ in their 
approach to financing. Targeted tax incentives subsidize certain legislatively 
favored activities and, therefore, comport with the pattern of privatization typically 
followed in the United States of retaining collective financing but delegating 
performance to the private sector (as in government contracting or voucher 
programs). Collective financing keeps resources under some type of government 
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control, with collectively defined goals achieved through the use of either public or 
private producers. 
The Article concludes with a discussion of accountability issues with regard to both 
financing and performance. Administrative lawyers and scholars are engaged in 
studying new ways in which regulation, contracts, and contract monitoring may 
respond to the accountability problems created by increased “contracting out” or 
privatizing of government services. A parallel effort to study ways in which 
increased monitoring of tax incentives can be achieved needs to be undertaken. Tax 
incentives generally do not involve negotiated relationships between government 
and private contractors, but typically involve tax reporting to the Internal Revenue 
Service and oversight jurisdiction by the tax-writing committees. The delivery of 
subsidies through the tax system can mask governmental funding levels and 
allocations and obscure accountability for outcomes being funded. The use of tax 
incentives as an alternative to discretionary spending by the government serves 
privatization goals through their use of market incentives and private choice. How 
to achieve greater political accountability for both the financing and performance of 
tax incentives remains a central challenge. The Article ends with suggestions for 
incremental ways to achieve such increased monitoring through budgetary and 
oversight reforms. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress defines and accomplishes public purposes through the exercise of its 
taxing and spending powers.1 Differences over taxing and spending levels, which are 
negotiated primarily through the legislative process,2 often reflect underlying 
disagreements about the role and scope of government.3 The political dynamics 
involve raw budgetary conflicts, contested ideas about the value of collective versus 
private choice,4 and deep differences in views about governmental competencies and 
 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States . . . .”). 
2 The negotiation process involves key players from both the executive and legislative 
branches, including the President and congressional leadership, and depending upon political 
factors, it may involve an executive/legislative “summit” meeting and agreement to resolve 
budgetary and tax issues. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
3 LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 6 
(2002). 
Disagreements over the legitimate scope of government benefit and constraint, and over the 
way that scope is affected by individual rights, are likely to underlie differences over taxation, 
even when they are not made explicit. These are disagreements about the extent and limits of 
our collective authority over one another through our common institutions. 
Id. 
4 See, e.g., Mark H. Moore, Introduction to Symposium, Public Values in an Era of 
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functions. These differences also underlie current political debates falling under the 
general rubric of “privatization.”5
The term “privatization” has been used to include a broad array of political and 
policy initiatives.6 Structurally, the choice between public and private7 involves the 
two basic dimensions of financing and performance.8 As noted by a scholar of 
privatization initiatives, the financing dimension concerns the choice between 
individual and collective financing: “Should we pay for some good or service 
individually, out of our own resources, or should we pay for it collectively with 
funds raised through one form or another of taxation?”9 The performance dimension 
involves the choice between governmental and nongovernmental production of 
goods and delivery of services: “Should the good be produced or the service 
delivered by a governmental organization or by a nongovernmental organization?”10 
In the United States, privatization has generally followed a pattern of “retaining 
 
Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (2003).  
5 See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1237–41 (2003). Although the United States has a long history of 
partnerships between the public and private sectors, recent privatization efforts differ from past 
patterns, according to Minow, in at least four important ways: 1) the use of direct financing and 
joint ventures rather than reliance on public policies to facilitate private enterprises; 2) the reversal 
of twentieth century trends toward expansion of the social safety net; 3) the use of market-style 
language and concepts in the provision of social services combined with the assumption that 
competition and individual choice are better, or more effective, than collective democratic 
governance; and 4) the increased partnering with religious organizations themselves, and not just 
their separate nonprofit social service agencies, to provide social services. Id. at 1240–41. 
6 Privatization proposals originate from multi-faceted political efforts to make the public 
sector more efficient, constrain its growth, or to downsize it. “Privatization” can refer to the 
divestiture of government-owned-and-operated property, “contracting out” or outsourcing of 
publicly provided goods and services, creation of public/private partnerships, or the removal of 
certain constraints on private choice. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and 
Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 456–62 (1988) (discussing the forms taken by privatization 
proposals, including divestiture, leasing and “contracting out,” improving service choices through 
deregulation, vouchers, or increasing direct dollar choices through user fees or by increasing the 
amount of money in private hands through tax reduction). 
7 For discussion of the difficulties in using the terms “public” and “private,” see, e.g., 
MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 29–35 (2002); 
Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1424 
(1982) (observing that taxation began to be understood as part of public law only with the 
development of theories of sovereignty in the seventeenth century, and that “[t]he emergence of the 
market as a central legitimating institution brought the public/private distinction into the core of 
legal discourse during the nineteenth century”); Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 
U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). See also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role]. 
8 JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 7 (1989). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
856 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65: 853 
 
                                                                                                                  
collective financing but delegating delivery to the private sector.”11
This Article examines the financing dimension of private choice with a focus on 
Congress’s taxing and spending decision-making processes. Increased private 
performance can be paid for by individual resources, facilitated by general tax 
reduction.12 Alternatively, private choice can be financed collectively by using tax 
revenues (or borrowed funds) to pay for privately provided goods and services or by 
using targeted tax incentives to stimulate private substitutes for public programs.13 
Although it can be difficult to distinguish between “taxes” and “prices,” or even 
between “taxing” and “spending,” individual and collective financing are not 
interchangeable. As argued in greater detail below, conflating them can obscure 
important political decisions about private choice and the government’s role in 
managing or monitoring collectively financed activities.14
Although the U.S. Constitution places few limitations on privatization,15 it 
serves as a “blueprint” to create an open political process for decision making about 
governmental functions.16 In political and economic discourse about privatization, 
the line between the public and private sectors is sometimes drawn by reference to 
“ownership,”17 and sometimes by other criteria such as the nature of the goods or 
 
11 Id. at 215. In the United States, aside from a limited number of asset sales, privatization has 
more generally meant “enlisting private energies to improve the performance of tasks that would 
remain in some sense public.” Id. at 7. See also ELLIOTT D. SCLAR, YOU DON’T ALWAYS GET 
WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 6 (2000) (noting that “[p]rivatization 
American style is essentially old-fashioned public contracting writ very large”). 
12 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE 
GOVERNMENT 229 (1988) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION] (“[T]he two most important forms of 
privatization in the United States have been deregulation and tax reduction.”). 
13 Stuart Butler, Privatization for Public Purposes, in PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
18, 20 (William T. Gormley, Jr. ed., 1987) (“The most complete form of privatization is 
the . . . shifting of a function entirely out of government . . . . The second most complete form of 
privatization is a combination of deregulation and tax incentives.”). See discussion infra Part II. 
14 See discussion infra Part IV. 
15 See Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization, 
46 AM. J. COMP. L. 481, 482 (Supp. 1998) (suggesting that the constitutional clause “that most 
clearly stands in the way of privatization [is] the guarantee of a republican form of government,” 
but noting that the Guarantee Clause has not been held judicially enforceable). Although Professors 
Gillette and Stephan find little constitutional authority dealing directly with the privatization 
process, they examine three areas where decisions to privatize encounter limitations that in some 
sense might be termed “constitutional,” focusing on “whether constitutional rules that normally 
would apply only to governmental actors might apply to privatized activities,” “federal 
administrative law governing decisions by the federal government to contract out its functions,” 
and state constitutional provisions affecting privatization. Id. at 482–83. 
16 Id. at 482; see also Cass, supra note 6, at 497–502. 
17 In countries other than the United States, the term generally refers to “selling government-
owned-and-operated businesses to private enterprise.” Cass, supra note 6, at 450; see, e.g., DIETER 
BÖS, PRIVATIZATION: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT 1–2 (1991) (discussing privatization in 
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services being provided, the receipt of public funds, or the public function of an 
activity.18  
Through its role as a representative decision-making body, Congress collectively 
defines “public” goals, purposes, and functions. Redrawn lines between what is 
understood as public and private could have a significant impact on upcoming public 
policy debates, including continuing discussions about taxes,19 school choice,20 
welfare policy and charitable choice,21 the budget deficit,22 and the future of the 
social security system.23 Resolution of these major policy issues or, alternatively, the 
 
Western European economies). 
18 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND 
PUBLIC ACTION 6–7, 121 (1982) (distinguishing between public action in the political realm—
involvement of the citizen in civic and community affairs—and attending to one’s private interests 
through the pursuit of increased material welfare for oneself and one’s family). 
19 See, e.g., Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 
Stat. 752; Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 
Stat. 38. 
20 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, 1776–873 
(providing assistance to enhance public school choice); Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, 58 (2001) (expanding Coverdell 
education savings accounts, I.R.C. § 530, to include qualified expenses of elementary and 
secondary students at public, private, or religious schools). See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 
536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (upholding under an Establishment Clause challenge Cleveland’s school 
voucher program, which “provide[d] assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, 
direct[ed] government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and 
independent private choice”). 
21 See, e.g., John J. DiIulio, Jr., Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1271, 1278–82 (2003); see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 35–38 (2001), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf [hereinafter THE 
PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA] (discussing community and faith-based initiatives to 
supplement existing charitable choice legislation); Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 
29, 2001) (establishing White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives); Exec. 
Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 29, 2001) (setting forth agency responsibilities with 
respect to Faith-Based and Community Initiatives). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (2000) 
(permitting states to provide welfare-related services through contracts with charitable, religious, 
and private organizations). 
22 See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, DO DEFICITS MATTER? 65–150 (1997) (reviewing the debate in 
economic literature about deficits); see also  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2005: OVERVIEW OF 
THE PRESIDENT’S 2005 BUDGET 10 (2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/budget/pdf/budget/overview.pdf (projecting a 
$521 billion deficit for fiscal year 2004). 
23 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SECURITY, STRENGTHENING SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS 11–13 (2001), available at 
http://www.commtostrengthensocsec.gov/reports/Final_report.pdf (presenting three plans for 
reforming social security and proposing individual accounts financed by diverting funds from 
858 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65: 853 
 
                                                                                                                  
failure to resolve them over the next several years will have important implications 
for how the government and the private sector address the country’s economic and 
social problems in the future. 
As in the past, the terms and structure of those debates will be defined in part by 
the resolution of more obscure tax and budget process choices. Congress coordinates 
its taxing and spending decisions through the budget process. It is through this 
process “that the Nation chooses what areas it wishes to leave to private choice and 
what services it wants to provide through government.”24 Although often technically 
complex in nature, decisions about tax and budgetary processes hold high stakes for 
the transparency of our democratic decision-making processes over the next few 
years. In politics, when and how the debate gets framed often determines the 
outcome. 
President George W. Bush, like President Ronald Reagan nearly twenty-five 
years ago, proposed and encouraged a broad range of privatization initiatives, and in 
this respect he continued and expanded the Reagan legacy. The Bush 
Administration25 also adopted certain modifications in the presentation of tax 
revenue information in the budget, in ways similar to those proposed and partially 
adopted during the Reagan Administration.26 As suggested below, the two 
developments, one representing core governmental philosophy and the other 
representing technical changes in the budget presentation, were not unconnected as a 
matter of political strategy. These changes have significant implications for debates 
about key public policy issues. 
 The debates also raise more fundamental questions for our democratic polity. 
Do public values represent something other than the aggregation of individual 
preferences? What role should public deliberation play in shaping preferences? How 
can public purposes best be achieved? In considering the complex public/private 
relationships typical of privatization initiatives, lawmakers forge legislative 
responses to these questions in varied contexts and, in the process, confront new 
questions of political legitimacy and accountability. 
The most complete form of privatization, in which both financing and 
performance are transferred to private actors, also implies a shift from collective, 
public decision making to more individualized, private decision making.27 
 
social security trust funds). 
24 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON BUDGET CONCEPTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION 
ON BUDGET CONCEPTS 11 (1967) (submitted to President Johnson by Commission Chairman David 
M. Kennedy and fifteen commission members, including Charles Schultze and Carl Shoup). 
25 Unless otherwise specified, references to the “Bush Administration” throughout the Article 
are to the presidential administration of President George W. Bush, beginning in 2001, and not to 
the administration of his father, President George Herbert Walker Bush, who was elected President 
in 1988 after serving as Vice President during both terms of Ronald Reagan’s presidency. 
26 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
27 Moore, supra note 4, at 1215 (observing that “we might see privatization most importantly 
as the individualization of judgments about value that formerly were made collectively”). 
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Privatization initiatives thus shift the locus of decision making. Privatization of both 
financing and performance necessarily results in a smaller sphere of government 
action. 
By contrast, collective financing keeps resources under some type of 
government control, with collectively defined goals achieved through the use of 
government-monitored contractors or other private producers. Although collective 
financing of private performance does not necessarily shrink the size of government, 
private performers may (or may not) provide the goods or services more efficiently 
or effectively than government employees. Collective and individual financing 
accordingly accomplish privatization goals in very different ways, with dramatically 
different consequences for both public administration and democratic decision 
making.  
My discussion proceeds as follows. The next Part begins with a brief overview 
of the financing and performance dimensions of privatization decisions, followed by 
an analysis of how taxation relates to both financing and performance. The level of 
taxation is an important political choice, which the constitutional framework leaves 
primarily to the political branches. The courts generally defer to congressional action 
in this area. Nevertheless, in the process of developing this highly deferential 
approach, courts have drawn distinctions between taxes and other means of paying 
for or regulating the production of goods and services. These distinctions illustrate 
and emphasize the important democratic values inherent in the taxing and spending 
powers. These values are reflected in the decision-making procedures established by 
the Constitution for collectively financed activities. 
Part III, which draws from and builds on tax scholarship relating to “tax 
expenditures,”28 sets forth the argument that general tax reduction and targeted tax 
incentives, both ways of advancing privatization goals, differ in approaches to 
financing. General tax reduction results in more individual financing of goods and 
services. Targeted tax incentives, on the other hand, subsidize certain legislatively 
favored activities and, therefore, comport with the pattern of privatization typically 
followed in the United States of retaining collective financing but delegating 
performance to the private sector. Across-the-board tax reduction and targeted tax 
incentives advance different privatization goals with very different political 
consequences. 
The argument that targeted tax incentives are more like spending programs than 
tax cuts is somewhat counterintuitive, and has been controversial in both academic 
and political quarters.29 Regardless of whether that argument is accepted as a matter 
of theory, however, the characterization of tax provisions as revenue raisers or 
revenue losers provides useful information to legislators because taxing and 
spending decisions tend to be made incrementally and by reference to a current 
budgetary or revenue baseline. The rest of Part III discusses some political and 
 
28 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
29 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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theoretical issues at stake in defining the revenue baseline. 
Part IV examines accountability issues. Administrative lawyers and scholars are 
engaged in studying new ways in which regulation, contracts, and contract 
monitoring may respond to the accountability problems created by increased 
“contracting out” or privatizing of government services.30 A parallel effort to study 
ways in which increased monitoring of tax incentives can be achieved needs to be 
undertaken. Tax incentives generally do not involve negotiated relationships 
between government and private contractors, but typically involve tax reporting to 
the Internal Revenue Service and oversight jurisdiction by the tax-writing 
committees. The delivery of subsidies through the tax system can mask 
governmental funding levels and allocations as well as obscure accountability for 
outcomes being funded. The use of tax incentives as an alternative to discretionary 
spending by government serves privatization goals through their use of market 
incentives and private choice. How to achieve greater political accountability for 
both the financing and performance of tax incentives remains a central challenge. 
Part IV ends with suggestions for ways to achieve such increased monitoring. 
The political debate about privatization focuses public attention on the roles 
played by government and by private enterprise in achieving societal goals, but at 
the same time may conceal more direct arguments about the proper goals for 
society.31 Discussion about government versus private performance, that is, about 
“ownership,” “outsourcing,” “management,” and “competition” can mask important 
disagreements about public values. These disagreements underlie the politics of 
taxation32 and under our constitutional framework are resolved in large part by 
Congress through the exercise of its taxing and spending powers. 
II. DEFINING PUBLIC VALUES: CONGRESSIONAL TAXING AND SPENDING 
POWERS 
In interpreting express limitations on the taxing power, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has distinguished between “taxes,” or “revenue raising,” and other methods of 
financing or regulating activities.33 Those distinctions, developed in varied 
constitutional contexts, capture certain important differences between collectively 
and individually financed activities and embody the democratic values inherent in 
the taxing and spending powers. Similar distinctions animate the financing and 
performance dimensions of privatization decisions. 
 
30 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1285, 1289 (2003); Freeman, Private Role, supra note 7, at 549, 574–92. 
31 Cass, supra note 6, at 452. 
32 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 8–10 (arguing that “[j]ustice or injustice in 
taxation . . . mean[s] justice or injustice in the system of property rights and entitlements that result 
from a particular tax regime”). 
33 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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A. The Public/Private Dimensions of Financing and Performance 
Privatization decisions contain dual dimensions of financing and performance. 
They involve choices between individual versus collective financing (primarily 
through taxation), and governmental versus private production of goods or delivery 
of services. The financing dimension is independent of the performance 
dimension,34 creating four possible combinations of public/private choice: 1) 
collective financing and governmental performance; 2) collective financing and 
private performance; 3) individual financing and governmental performance; and 4) 
individual financing and private performance.35
In the first pair of these combinations, collective financing and governmental 
performance, the government raises revenues through taxes and produces the goods 
or delivers the services through a government agency. Privatization proponents often 
have this combination in mind when they urge reform. For example, tax dollars used 
by the government to provide public schools or social welfare services would fit this 
pattern. 
In the second pair, collective financing and private performance, the government 
raises revenue, but then contracts with the private sector to deliver the goods or 
services. Tax dollars used to pay private contractors to build roads, prisons, or supply 
 
34 A similar distinction between financing and production was made by Richard Musgrave in 
discussing the use of fiscal instruments to secure adjustments in the allocation of resources. See 
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 3–27 
(1959) (explaining the allocation, distribution, and stabilization functions of public budgets). 
Musgrave distinguished between “provision for public wants” and “production.” He explained 
what he meant by the government “providing” for the satisfaction of public wants as follows: 
We mean, simply, that the goods and services needed to satisfy public wants must be 
paid for out of general revenue. The goods and services must be supplied free of direct charge 
to the user; at the same time, they need not be produced under the direct management or 
supervision of the government. 
Id. at 15. He thus distinguished between goods “produced by the government and sold on the 
market” and goods “produced privately but purchased by the government and distributed free of 
direct charge.” Id. In the first case, “there is no provision for public wants, while all production is 
under public management,” and in the second case, “there is no public production, but all resources 
are devoted to provision for public wants.” Id. 
35 DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 7–8. As Donahue points out, the distinction between public and 
private is “a good deal messier” than the categories suggest. Id. at 8. Comparisons must be qualified 
by the variety of possible organizational forms, ambiguous distinctions between taxes and prices, 
and political processes involved in choices about what to pay for collectively. Id. at 8–9. 
For a similar explication of the financing and performance dimensions of public versus private 
choice, see Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An 
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 27 (Lester M. 
Salamon ed., 2002). I disagree, however, with Salamon’s categorization of special tax advantages 
as an example of private finance and private delivery. See Id. at 28. For development of the view 
that they combine collective financing with private delivery, see discussion infra Part III.B. 
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government offices with computers and paper fit within this pattern. So do school 
voucher programs, in which tax dollars are used to finance the purchase by 
individuals of educational services provided by private schools. 
In the third pair, individual financing combined with governmental performance, 
the government charges individuals a “user fee” for the goods or services provided. 
Thus, the financing is private but the performance remains tied in some way to 
government. The government may charge an individual or business a cost-based fee, 
for example, for postal services, access to camp grounds at national parks, or use of 
certain government-provided harbor services or maritime facilities. 
Finally, the last pair, which combines individual financing with private sector 
delivery, “covers the large share of the economy in which the government role is 
limited to enforcing contracts and otherwise regulating, monitoring, and certifying 
private exchange.”36 This pattern would include private market transactions, such as 
the purchase of a haircut, a personal automobile, or a share of stock. 
1. General Tax Reduction: Individual Financing of Private Performance 
At the most fundamental level, privatization poses questions about the 
appropriate level of taxation needed or desired to fund the public sector.37 
Privatization proponents typically advocate tax reduction as a means to achieve a 
reduction in the size of government, combining individual financing with private 
production of goods and services. 
For example, in the 1980s President Reagan created a commission to study the 
appropriate division of responsibilities between the federal government and the 
private sector. The Report of the President’s Commission on Privatization described 
privatization as “part of a fundamental political and economic rethinking” about the 
role of government in the modern welfare state.38 According to the Commission, tax 
reform in the 1980s accomplished “major reductions and simplifications” in federal 
taxation, which were intended to diminish “government influence over private sector 
activity.”39
 
36 DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 7. 
37 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1 (Rev. 4th ed. 2002) (“Taxation is the process by which a government 
transfers resources (almost always money) from the private to the public sector.”); see also, e.g., 
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 76 (“Taxation . . . determines how much of a society’s 
resources will come under the control of government, for expenditure in accordance with some 
collective decision procedure, and how much will be left in the discretionary control of private 
individuals, as their personal property.”); MUSGRAVE, supra note 34, at 5–24 (describing the 
objectives of budget policy as including allocation, distribution, and stabilization functions). 
38 PRIVATIZATION, supra note 12, at xii. 
39 Id. at 229. The Commission described the role of tax reduction as follows: 
 The United States has also been a leader in the effort to reduce the intrusiveness of 
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Twenty years later, the Bush Administration’s initial approach to taxation 
echoed the Reagan Administration’s tax-rate-reduction approach.40 General tax 
reduction serves privatization goals by decreasing government revenues and 
increasing the amount of money in private hands, thereby reducing the role played 
by government. George W. Bush made that link explicit when he campaigned in 
support of major tax relief: “[T]he surplus is not the government’s money—the 
surplus is the people’s money, and we ought to trust them with their own money.”41 
After the 2000 election, President Bush made a major tax cut a legislative priority, 
and accomplished it in substantial part during the first six months of his 
administration.42
Although individual financing combined with private performance results in the 
most complete form of privatization by shifting both the financing and performance 
of a function to the private sector, it also raises serious concerns about distributive 
fairness.43 Complete privatization would allow individual preferences to be asserted 
through the marketplace, but only as permitted by the individual’s income and 
wealth. 
Redistributive policies can be implemented by providing the least well-off with 
government-provided food, shelter, education, and health care, by providing them 
with minimum levels of income44 or wealth45 to make their own choices about what 
 
taxation in the private economy. By the 1980s tax rates in many nations had reached the point 
of inhibiting private initiative, and taxes were exerting a pervasive influence on the behavior 
of private corporations and individuals. The major reductions and simplifications in federal 
taxation that occurred in the 1980s were intended to diminish this form of government 
influence over private sector activity. 
Id. 
40 See, e.g., C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 210 (2004). 
41 Dana Milbank, Bush Signs Tax Bill Into Law: Lawmakers Spar Over Whether to Pare or 
Extend $1.35 Trillion Cut, WASH. POST, June 8, 2001, at A1 (describing the tax cut as fulfilling his 
“signature campaign promise” and describing many of the President’s words at the signing 
ceremony as “the same he used on the campaign trail to sell his plan”); see also David Firestone & 
Alison Mitchell, In Hot Debate, Bush and McCain Collide over Campaign’s Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 16, 2000, at A1 (quoting Candidate Bush as saying “either you trust the people or you trust 
government” and describing his tax cut as giving people their money back). 
42 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 
Stat. 38. 
43 See, e.g., SCLAR, supra note 11, at 4 (“Ideology that places market concerns ahead of those 
of equity and access animates the larger political discourse in which privatization is advocated.”); 
Paul Starr, The Case for Skepticism, in PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 25, 27–29 (William 
T. Gormley, Jr. ed., 1991) [hereinafter Starr, Case for Skepticism]. 
44 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 161–76 (1963). 
45 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 4–5 (1999) 
(presenting and defending a proposal of providing each citizen, upon reaching adulthood, a one-
time grant of $80,000 financed by an annual 2% wealth tax); ROBERT HAVEMAN, STARTING EVEN: 
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM TO COMBAT THE NATION’S NEW POVERTY 168–71, 272 (1988) 
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they need or want, or through private charity. Arguably either governmental or 
private performance can achieve the desired level of societal redistribution. 
Accordingly, the reasons for or against government performance are not 
necessarily reasons for or against redistribution.46 The reasons for or against 
redistribution, however, often underlie arguments for or against collective 
financing.47 Decisions about taxation involve in part a collective determination about 
how much inequality in the distribution of income and wealth will be tolerated.48 
Fairness in collection of the tax relates to each individual’s ability to pay a share of 
governmental cost of publicly provided goods and services. The overall 
redistributive role of the public budget49 is an important political choice, which our 
constitutional framework leaves primarily to the political branches.50 The reasons for 
and against governmental performance instead tend to center on efficiency and 
accountability concerns. 
 
(developing the idea, proposed in 1968 by Nobel Prize Winner Professor James Tobin, of an 
“endowment” account or a “universal capital” account that would be assigned to all youths upon 
graduation from high school, which could be used to support certain human capital investments of 
their choice). 
46 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 76–77 (arguing that reasons for and against putting 
resources under government rather than private control are not necessarily reasons for or against 
redistributing resources among groups or individuals and distinguishing between the “public-
private division” and “distribution”). 
47 See, e.g., Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of 
Social Security Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 983 (2000) (arguing that “what is frequently 
portrayed as a numbers problem to which a ‘correct’ answer can be found is in fact an ideological 
and political argument about wealth building versus direct income support and . . . of public 
entitlement as opposed to private property rights”); Lisa Philipps, Taxing the Market Citizen: Fiscal 
Policy and Inequality in an Age of Privatization, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 113–18 (2000) 
(arguing that recent tax reforms in Canada signal a shift away from the redistributive ideals of 
social citizenship toward a more individualistic model of market citizenship). 
48 See generally Moore, supra note 4, at 1215–17 (describing Milton Friedman’s proposal as 
“a particularly radical form of privatization, untainted by the problem of an ‘unfair’ distribution of 
income” by in effect publicly financing a collectively determined minimum level of income and 
wealth for everyone). 
49 See MUSGRAVE, supra note 34, at 18 (suggesting that adjustments in the distribution of 
income and wealth secured through the tax and transfer system, if implemented properly, tend to 
involve the least interference in the efficient functioning of the economy). 
50 Although the U.S. Constitution links the power to tax with the power to spend for the 
“general welfare” the courts have largely deferred to the political process for determination of the 
public purposes appropriate for congressional action. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 
65–68 (1936) (observing that “Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the 
general welfare,” and adopting an expansive view of the scope of the spending power); South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing Butler and noting that “[i]n considering whether a 
particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially 
to the judgment of Congress”); see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
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2. Tax Incentives and Private Performance 
Privatization initiatives are part of a broader public law shift from centrally 
managed government programs to decentralized and market-based models.51 Under 
these models, federally funded programs are managed by state or local government 
officials, by quasi-governmental bodies, or are contracted out to private firms or 
nonprofit organizations.52 The paradigm here would be competitive “contracting 
out” by the government of collectively financed goods or services. 
In the tax context, the term “privatization” can suggest an array of specific 
management-related initiatives, such as “contracting out” tax-administration services 
to private entities,53 or the use of tax-exempt nonprofit or “faith-based” organizations 
to provide welfare-related services formerly provided by government personnel.54
 
51 See, e.g., B. GUY PETERS, THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING: FOUR EMERGING MODELS 2, 21 
(1996). 
52 See, e.g., Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Powers to Private 
Actors, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1687–824 (2002); Paul R. Verkuil, Reverse Yardstick Competition: A 
New Deal for the Nineties, 45 FLA. L. REV. 1, 5, 7–8, 11–12 (1993); see also A. Michael 
Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 546 (1995); Nancy 
J. Knauer, Reinventing Government: The Promise of Institutional Choice and Government Created 
Charitable Organizations, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 945, 952–53 (1997). 
53 Such proposed initiatives include pilot programs for private tax collection, outsourcing of 
tax return processing, and using private contractors for electronic return filing. See, e.g., GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX DEBT COLLECTION: IRS IS ADDRESSING CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
FOR CONTRACTING OUT BUT WILL NEED TO STUDY THE BEST USE OF RESOURCES 2–4 (2004), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04492.pdf (discussing FY2005 budget proposal to use 
private collection agencies to help collect tax debts); George Guttman, News Analysis: How the IRS 
May Test the Use of Private Collectors, 69 TAX NOTES 1435, 1435 (1995) (describing a $13 
million allocation in the 1996 IRS appropriation for a pilot program using private law firms and 
debt collection agencies to collect outstanding tax debts); see also, e.g., George Guttman, News 
Analysis: Where is IRS Modernization Heading?, 86 TAX NOTES 1191, 1193 (2000) (reporting that 
much of the processing of returns that had planned to be outsourced by the IRS to the private sector 
is instead being done by electronic return originators); James J. McGovern, The Tax Exempt and 
Government Entities Division—The Pathfinder, 86 TAX NOTES 219, 229 (2000) (reporting on the 
outsourcing of employee plans return processing). See generally Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Private 
Tax Collectors: A Roman, Christian, and Jewish Perspective, 104 TAX NOTES 963, 968 (2004) 
(concluding from historical experiments with private tax collection that the government should 
provide adequate safeguards and ongoing supervision). 
54 Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare 
As We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493, 528–42 (1999) (discussing the charitable choice provisions in 
welfare reform legislation); see also Michele Estrin Gilman, “Charitable Choice” and the 
Accountability Challenge: Reconciling the Need for Regulation with the First Amendment Religion 
Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REV. 799, 801, 806–07 (2002); Steven K. Green, Book Review, The 
Ambiguity of Neutrality, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 692 (2001) (reviewing CHARLES GLENN, THE 
AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-BASED SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL AGENCIES 
(2000)); Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, 
Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2000) (reporting 
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Privatization can also be fostered more generally, however, through other more 
substantive tax provisions, including various types of tax incentives. Targeted tax 
incentives encourage private businesses or individuals to engage in certain socially 
or economically favored activities.55 This type of “privatization” also involves a 
redrawing of lines between the public and private sectors, making public goals 
private interests by modifying market incentives.56
 Tax incentives operate by reducing the prices of favored goods or services, 
relying on the market to determine how much production and consumption of the 
desired output actually occurs.57 Thus, they provide an alternative to public 
programs managed by government bureaucrats by encouraging private individuals 
and businesses to act in their own economic self-interest. Although they rely on 
market responses, they alter existing market incentives through tax reduction for 
certain types of activities. In the context of tax incentives, line-drawing issues 
between public and private also relate to the distinction between taxes and prices, a 
distinction quite ambiguous in practice.58
 
that “41 percent of charitable organizations providing human services receive government grants,” 
citing a study published in 1993). 
55 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 13, at 17. Butler argues that deregulation and tax incentives 
achieve privatization goals for the following reasons: 
The most general argument for deregulation applies in this instance—improving efficiency 
and economic benefits through competition. The case for tax incentives as an added boost is 
that by encouraging individuals to behave in a way that meets a particular public objective, 
such as providing incentives for private medical coverage and private pension programs, 
these services can be provided more efficiently than through publicly provided systems. 
Id. at 20–21. 
56 See, e.g., CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 5–6 (1977) 
(arguing for “collective influence over individual and business behavior” by “modifying the 
incentives of the private market” so that “public goals become private interests,” rather than 
“removing a set of decisions from the decentralized and incentive-oriented private market and 
transferring them to the command-and-control techniques of government bureaucracy”). 
57 See Eric J. Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending—Does It Make a Difference?, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 
361, 362, 366–67 (2000). Their use expands the role of the tax system beyond its traditional 
revenue-raising function. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
58 DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 9. Donahue explains the distinction as follows:  
If a payment is attached to something essential . . . then the payment may be called a fee or 
price though it remains, in essence, a tax. Similarly, a tax that can easily be avoided by a 
change in behavior—like building a home or factory on one side or the other of a 
jurisdictional boundary—looks very much like a price. 
Id. He then observes that “[t]rading on the ambiguous distinctions between prices and taxes can be 
politically expeditious” but that “it should not obscure the central issue: Should the item in question 
be paid for individually or collectively?” Id. 
A premise of Musgrave’s allocation function of public budgets is that “satisfaction of social 
wants must be related to individual evaluations of benefits received.” See MUSGRAVE, supra note 
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After its first major tax rate cut, the Bush Administration, like administrations 
before it, increasingly turned to the tax code as a means of implementing specific 
domestic policy initiatives.59 As observed by a commentator on proposals in 
President Bush’s fiscal year 2003 budget submission: “The limos from the Education 
Department and Energy Department found their way to the Treasury building, and 
their passengers—with the full backing of the White House—were insisting that 
Treasury officials help them write ‘tax laws.’”60 As in administrations past, the Bush 
Administration used the tax code “to implement a broad range of policies that really 
have nothing to do with collecting revenue.”61
Privatization proponents tend to favor tax incentives as a more effective 
alternative to other types of government programs. They use the existing tax system 
to stimulate private activity, a mechanism which permits the market to respond to 
individual preferences.62 Proponents tend to view the market as representing an 
aggregation of individual preferences and thus an effective and cost-efficient way of 
achieving goals. Under this view, public purposes would be well served by programs 
that permit the market to operate with as little government control as possible. 
Critics of privatization point out that increased private choice results in less 
participation in democratic political decision making63 and diminished political 
 
34, at 20. Under the allocation function, taxes and expenditures serve as a tax-purchase mechanism 
for providing public wants, as distinguished from the function of taxes and transfers in the 
distribution branch. The distribution branch determines and secures the “proper” distribution of 
income and wealth. The proper state of distribution is defined in terms of income earned minus 
taxes or plus the transfers the distribution branch imposes. Taxes collected by the allocation branch 
are disregarded by the distribution branch, and treated like personal expenditures made in relation 
to the taxpayer’s own evaluation of the social wants being satisfied. Id. at 20–21. 
59 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 66 (2003), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/spec.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET, FY 
2004] (proposing tax incentives for charitable giving, strengthening education, investing in health 
care, protecting the environment, increasing energy production, and promoting energy 
conservation). 
60 Martin A. Sullivan, Tax Expenditures for Republicans, 94 TAX NOTES 1571, 1571–72 
(2002). 
61 Id. at 1572. 
62 However, tax incentives do not necessarily reduce overall public spending. See, e.g., Lester 
M. Salamon, The Changing Tools of Government Action: An Overview, in BEYOND 
PRIVATIZATION: THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT ACTION 3, 4–11 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 1989) 
[hereinafter Salamon, The Changing Tools]; Paul Starr, The Limits of Privatization, in PROSPECTS 
FOR PRIVATIZATION 124, 125 (Steve H. Hanke ed., 1987) [hereinafter Starr, The Limits of 
Privatization] (explaining that many proposals for program termination contemplate the use of tax 
incentives to stimulate private substitutes for public services and thus may not reduce public 
spending); see also Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures as Tools of Government Action, in 
BEYOND PRIVATIZATION: THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT ACTION 167, 170–71, 184–90 (Lester M. 
Salamon ed., 1989). 
63 E.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 1–18 (1987) (discussing a democratic 
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transparency and accountability.64 Politics offer a process for preference formation 
through the protection of voting rights and procedures for political deliberation, 
including open proceedings and constitutional protections for public discussion and 
criticism.65 Private firms have fewer obligations to provide access to information 
about their operations or the reasons for their decisions.  
The critics tend to view public values as representing something other than the 
aggregation of individual preferences. They point out that the exercise of individual 
choice in the marketplace is quite different from collective choice exercised through 
political participation in the democratic process.66 The marketplace records 
individual preferences through purchasing power.67 Its increased use for collectively 
financed activities, critics argue, may result in a loss of political participation and 
deliberation as well as the loss of those choices made possible through government 
action.68  
It thus matters politically whether targeted tax deductions or tax credits are 
viewed as equivalent to collectively financed but privately provided goods or 
services (that is, as subsidies), or instead as equivalent to general tax reduction, 
making more individual resources available for private choice (that is, as tax cuts).69 
Before turning to that discussion, however, first a consideration of the areas in which 
courts have enforced limits on Congress’s taxing and spending powers. The 
limitations, to the extent they have been enforced by the courts, illustrate the 
democratic values inhering in the taxing and spending powers, which are reflected in 
the decision-making procedures established by the Constitution for collectively 
financed activities. In defining such limitations, the courts have distinguished 
between individual financing of goods and services through “user” fees and 
collective financing through taxation. 
B. Constitutional Limitations on the Taxing and Spending Powers 
 
theory of education). In discussing publicly financed voucher plans to increase parental choice of 
schools, Gutmann argues that “[m]inimally constrained voucher plans . . . avoid the controversial 
issue of how schools should educate citizens only at the cost of denying our collective interests in 
democratic education” and that the “most defensible” “[m]aximally constrained voucher 
plans . . . appear to avoid the issue only by shifting our controversies over democratic education 
from a mixture of local, state, and national politics to a more purely centralized politics.” Id. at 68–
69. 
64 E.g., Starr, The Case for Skepticism, supra note 43, at 27–29; Starr, The Limits of 
Privatization, supra note 62, at 131–36. 
65 Starr, The Limits of Privatization, supra note 62, at 132. 
66 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY 128–36, 141, 166–67 (1996). 
67 See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL 
STATEMENT 14–18 (1980). 
68 Starr, The Limits of Privatization, supra note 62, at 132. 
69 See discussion infra Part III. 
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 Although the Constitution links the taxing power with the power to spend for 
the “general welfare,” the courts have largely deferred to the political process for 
determination of the public purposes appropriate for congressional action. In 
interpreting express constitutional limits on the taxing power, however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has analyzed the taxing power in relation to its financing function. 
Differences between collective and individual financing underlie certain distinctions 
important in constitutional analysis. The cases suggest that the express constitutional 
limitations on the taxing power are enforced when Congress is engaged in general 
“revenue raising” as opposed to collecting fees in exchange for goods or services. 
That is, an imposition may be a “tax” when funds are collected from private parties 
for a “public” purpose. In addition, the Court has drawn historically significant 
distinctions between “taxes” and “penalties” for regulatory violations. 
1. The Taxing Power 
The U.S. Constitution vests in Congress the power to tax, placing certain express 
limitations on its exercise.70 These limitations include the uniformity requirement 
imposed on indirect taxes,71 the prohibition against the taxation of exports,72 and the 
 
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 841–
43 (3d ed. 2000); Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal 
Government, 41 TAX LAW. 3, 3–12 (1987) [hereinafter Bittker, Constitutional Limits]. Bittker 
quotes Chief Justice Chase’s summary of the “very extensive” federal power to tax as follows: 
It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress 
cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect 
taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may 
be exercised at discretion. 
Id. at 4 (quoting The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1866)). 
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout 
the United States”). 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the uniformity requirement to mean “geographic” 
uniformity rather than uniformity as applied to individuals. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 106–
09 (1900) (holding the federal inheritance tax constitutional, even though it increased rates 
progressively as the size of the legacy increased, because it taxed the subject of the tax at the same 
rate throughout the United States). Even so, the Court has permitted Congress “to take into account 
differences that exist between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve 
geographically isolated problems.” The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 
159 (1974). See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85 (1983) (holding constitutional an 
exemption of certain Alaskan oil from the Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 by concluding that 
Congress had acted on the basis of “neutral factors” relating to the ecology, environment, and 
remoteness of the favored area). 
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any 
State.”). See, e.g., United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 367–70 (1998) (striking 
down an ad valorem harbor maintenance tax as applied to goods loaded at U.S. ports for export as 
not reflecting a fair approximation of services, benefits, and facilities provided to exporters, and 
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apportionment requirement imposed on direct taxes.73 In addition, all bills for 
“raising revenue” must originate in the House of Representatives.74
The taxing power is also limited by the cross-cutting limitations of the Bill of 
Rights,75 which can apply to any exercise of congressional power. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out by Professor Boris Bittker, the Supreme Court has generally accorded 
Congress a presumption of validity in the exercise of its taxing power: 
 
thus, not a permissible user fee); United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 854–56 
(1996) (holding that a tax on policies insuring exports is functionally the same as a tax on exports); 
Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 375–76 (1875) (upholding a tobacco stamp requirement as a user fee 
rather than a prohibited export tax). For a recent discussion of these cases, see Erik M. Jensen, The 
Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 16–42 (2003). 
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census”); id. § 2, cl. 3 (“direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers”). 
In Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895), the Court held that an 
income tax is a direct tax (insofar as the source of income is property) and therefore invalid unless 
apportioned. In so holding, the Court reversed course from an earlier determination that the income 
tax adopted during the Civil War was an indirect excise tax. See Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 
586, 602 (1880); see also Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 171, 173–84 (1796) (upholding 
federal tax on carriages as indirect tax not subject to apportionment requirement). The distinction 
between direct and indirect taxes and the pre- and post-Civil War history leading to the enactment 
of the Sixteenth Amendment is discussed in Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1999) and Calvin Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up at the 
Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3–5, 46–71, 73–82 (1999). 
The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, provides that “Congress shall have power to lay 
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the 
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.” U.S. CONST. amend XVI. 
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”). 
See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389–97 (1990) (rejecting the 
government’s argument that an Origination Clause challenge presented a nonjusticiable political 
question). See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 422–27 (2004) (suggesting that the origination privilege may evolve as a 
norm governing the behavior of bicameral legislatures “in which the lower house specializes in 
information in return for the distributive advantage of having the first move”). 
75 With regard to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, for example, the 
Court has recognized that a taxpayer may assert the privilege in a tax return, but the privilege does 
not entitle a taxpayer to refuse to file any tax return at all. See generally United States v. Sullivan, 
274 U.S. 259, 263–64 (1927) (upholding the conviction of a bootlegger for willfully failing to file 
an income tax return, but suggesting that the taxpayer may claim the privilege with respect to 
specific items). However, an otherwise valid tax may not impose a reporting or registration 
requirement that would violate the taxpayer’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60–61 (1968) (reversing a conviction 
for violating a federal excise tax registration requirement imposed on those who engaged in the 
business of accepting wagers, a criminal act in defendant’s state, where the information was 
required by statute to be shared with law enforcement officials). 
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[E]ven in the heyday of the judicial use of the due process clause to oversee 
legislation regulating private business, the Supreme Court virtually deprived it of 
any jurisdiction over the federal taxing power, stating in Brushaber v. Union Pacific 
Railroad that “the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring upon the 
one hand a taxing power and taking the same power away on the other by the 
limitations of the due process clause.”76
Although the Court recognized a residual judicial function to intervene in 
extreme cases if a “tax[] provision ‘was so arbitrary . . . [as to constitute] confiscation 
of property,’” a presumption of validity was accorded congressional action.77
Shortly after Brushaber, however, the Court decided a series of cases that 
judicially distinguished valid revenue measures from invalid regulatory measures. In 
the Child Labor Tax Case78 and others decided during the first few decades of the 
last century,79 the Court held that a valid taxing provision “must be naturally and 
reasonably adapted to the collection of the tax and not solely to the achievement of 
some other purpose plainly within state power.”80 A tax is a regulatory measure, and 
thus invalid if not authorized by some independent source of congressional 
regulatory power,81 if it is triggered by violation of a series of specified conditions 
enacted along with the tax.82 Although a tax could have an “incidental” regulatory 
effect, a tax is unconstitutional “in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-
called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the 
characteristics of regulation and punishment.”83
In the Child Labor Tax Case, the Court concluded that the excise tax imposed 
upon an employer’s noncompliance with federal regulations on the use of child labor 
 
76 Bittker, Constitutional Limits, supra note 70, at 11 (quoting Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 
240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916)). 
77 Id. (quoting Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24). 
78 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) [hereinafter Child Labor Tax Case]. 
79 E.g., Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66 (1922) (invalidating a tax imposed upon 
noncompliance with federal regulation of grain boards of trade, which was imposed almost entirely 
to compel compliance with regulations unrelated to the collection of the tax); see also Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 289 (1936) (invalidating a “tax” as a “penalty” and thus beyond the 
taxing power and exceeding the commerce power); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 
295–97 (1935) (holding a special federal excise tax on liquor dealers operating in violation of state 
or local laws to be an invalid “penalty” because it exacted an exorbitant amount of money 
compared to that assessed against law-abiding dealers, took effect only after a state or local law had 
been violated, and usurped the states’ police powers). 
80 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 43 (citing United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 
(1919)). 
81 See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 549 (1869) (upholding a federal tax on 
banknotes issued by state banks since Congress had an independent source of power to regulate 
currency under Article I, § 8). 
82 TRIBE, supra note 70, at 844. 
83 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38. 
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was invalid,84 since the Commerce Clause at that time was not thought to permit 
federal regulation of child labor.85 When the Court later took a more expansive view 
of congressional Commerce Clause powers,86 the doctrinal distinction between a tax 
as a valid revenue measure and as an invalid regulatory device no longer served as a 
meaningful limitation on federal regulatory authority.87
After the New Deal Court’s post-1937 expansion of national legislative 
powers,88 the Court never again invalidated a federal tax as an effort to impose 
 
84 The federal statute at issue provided as follows:  
That every person (other than a bona fide boys' or girls' canning club recognized by the 
Agricultural Department of a State and of the United States) operating (a) any mine or quarry 
situated in the United States in which children under the age of sixteen years have been 
employed or permitted to work during any portion of the taxable year; or (b) any mill, 
cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment situated in the United States in 
which children under the age of fourteen years have been employed or permitted to work, or 
children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen have been employed or permitted to work 
more than eight hours in any day or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of 
seven o'clock post meridian, or before the hour of six o'clock ante meridian, during any 
portion of the taxable year, shall pay for each taxable year, in addition to all other taxes 
imposed by law, an excise tax equivalent to 10 per centum of the entire net profits received or 
accrued for such year from the sale or disposition of the product of such mine, quarry, mill, 
cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment. 
Id. at 34–35. 
85 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918). 
86 Prior to 1937, the Court had upheld, under the Commerce Clause, congressional regulation 
of interests affected with a public interest located in a current of interstate commerce, such as the 
stockyard in Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922). Similarly, the Court upheld regulation of the 
grain board of trade, in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 31–33 (1923), under a 
revised law tailored to respond to the Court’s objections to Congress’s unsuccessful earlier attempt 
to use its taxing power to regulate the same commodities exchange in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 
(1922). See, e.g., Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can it be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 1513, 1558–76 (2002) (discussing doctrinal developments in the Court’s pre-New Deal era and 
explaining the special difficulties posed for the Court by the Child Labor Tax Case). 
87 The considerations employed by the Court in distinguishing between revenue measures and 
prohibitory regulatory measures have been relied upon, in part, in federal or state tax cases dealing 
with Fifth Amendment limitations. TRIBE, supra note 70, at 845 n.16 (discussing double jeopardy 
and self-incrimination cases). See Dep’t of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 
779–83 (1994) (holding that a state tax on marijuana imposed on those who had been criminally 
prosecuted for marijuana possession constituted a punishment for double jeopardy purposes). 
88 For a description of the fault lines in the Court’s jurisprudence created by the virtual demise 
of economic due process, see Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme 
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 36–45. McCloskey argued that an 
explicit decision “to discard substantive due process root-and-branch would have compelled the 
Justices . . . to examine the basis of their abnegation.” Id. at 40. The preservation of old rhetoric left 
“a large gap in the rationale that underlies the structure of modern constitutional law.” Id. In the 
end, he observed, “we are left with a judicial policy which rejects supervision over economic 
matters and asserts supervision over ‘personal rights’; and with a rationale, so far as the written 
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regulatory standards outside the scope of other enumerated powers.89 Because any 
such taxes would have been upheld as a necessary and proper exercise of the 
Commerce Clause, the relationship between the taxing power and other legislative 
powers received no serious discussion or reconsideration by the Court in subsequent 
years.90
To summarize, the congressional taxing power is extensive, and the judiciary 
largely accords Congress a presumption of validity in the exercise of the power. In 
defining the limits of the power, the courts in the early part of the last century 
distinguished revenue measures from regulatory taxes. Taxes were upheld as valid 
revenue measures rather than prohibited regulatory taxes if they were unconditional 
taxes, achieving their regulatory effects through their rate structure,91 or if their 
regulatory provisions bore a “reasonable relation” to their enforcement as a revenue 
measure.92 When this doctrinal distinction became less salient after the Court’s view 
of the commerce power expanded, the Court also generally tended to treat tax 
provisions producing revenue as constituting a valid “revenue” measure.93
The courts have offered limited additional guidance with regard to the meaning 
of the term “revenue” in other constitutional contexts, distinguishing between 
revenue measures and special assessments or user fees. In interpreting the 
 
opinions go, that might support withdrawal from both fields but does not adequately justify the 
discrimination between them.” Id. at 45. As in the substantive due process area, the Court has never 
fully repudiated the vocabulary it used to distinguish between “taxes” and regulatory “penalties.” 
89 TRIBE, supra note 70, at 845. See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513–14 
(1937) (upholding a federal license tax on firearms dealers and observing that it is beyond the 
competency of the courts to “[i]nquir[e] into the hidden motives which may move Congress to 
exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it . . . .”). See also, e.g., Mulford v. Smith, 307 
U.S. 38, 47–51 (1939) (upholding the imposition of penalties under the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1938); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940) (“The power of 
taxation, granted to Congress by the Constitution, may be utilized as a sanction for the exercise of 
another power which is granted it.”). 
90 The Court’s recent more restrictive view of congressional Commerce Clause powers, 
beginning with United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), could revitalize the distinction 
between valid revenue measures and prohibited regulatory taxes. See TRIBE, supra note 70, at 846 
& n.19,  cf. Post, supra note 86, at 1639 (placing pre-New Deal federalism in historical context and 
observing that “[t]he Taft Court’s suspicion of federal legislation was grounded simultaneously in a 
commitment to economic rights deemed essential to ‘the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men’ 
and in a brooding mistrust of Congress’s capacity authentically to register a national democratic 
will, especially when compared to the Court’s own legitimate role as a common law conservator of 
public values”). 
91 See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 50–64 (1904) (upholding as a revenue measure 
a tax of ten cents per pound on yellow oleomargarine even though the corresponding tax on white 
oleomargarine was one fourth of a cent per pound). 
92 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94–95 (1919) (upholding registration requirement 
bearing some reasonable relation to its enforcement as a tax measure even if it may have been 
motivated in part by its regulatory effects); see TRIBE, supra note 70, at 844. 
93 TRIBE, supra note 70, at 846 n.19. 
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Origination Clause, which requires that all bills for “raising revenue” originate in the 
House of Representatives,94 the Supreme Court has included revenues intended for 
the general support of government but not special assessments designed to fund 
specific programs from fines or fees.95 For purposes of interpreting the Export 
Clause, the Supreme Court has similarly distinguished between prohibited taxes on 
exports and permissible “user fees” tied to specific benefits, services, or facilities.96
2. Spending Power: The Scope of the General Welfare Clause 
The spending power is textually linked with the taxing power in Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”97 Thus, Article I couples the 
taxing power with the power to spend for the “general welfare.”98 In interpreting the 
 
94 In this context, the term “raising revenue” has been interpreted by lower federal courts as 
broadly encompassing provisions “relating to” revenue. Taxpayers challenged a large federal tax 
increase enacted in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 
97-248, 96 Stat. 324. The legislation began as a House bill cutting taxes, but was replaced by a 
Senate amendment increasing taxes. Taxpayers argued that TEFRA violated the Origination Clause 
because the revenue-raising provisions originated in the Senate, not in the House. The federal 
appellate courts rejected such challenges, generally holding that the term “raising revenue” refers to 
all legislation relating to taxes regardless of its revenue effect, and that the bill passed by the House, 
and later amended by the Senate and agreed to by the House, was a bill to “raise revenue” within 
the meaning of the Origination Clause. Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 
1985); Wardell v. United States, 757 F.2d 203, 205 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Heitman v. United 
States, 753 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); see also Texas Ass’n of Concerned Taxpayers, 
Inc. v. United States, 772 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding the question to be nonjusticiable), 
476 U.S. 1151 (1986); Rowe v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 1516, 1519 (D. Del. 1984), aff’d mem., 
749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984) (reaching the merits and rejecting the Origination Clause challenge). 
As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Armstrong, the revenue effect of legislation is difficult to 
predict, and may depend on whether one looks to the long-term or short-run effects. 759 F.2d at 
1381. See Bittker, Constitutional Limits, supra note 70, at 5–6. See also Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 
220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911). 
95 See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 388 (1990) (holding that a statute 
that creates a particular governmental program to compensate crime victims and that raises revenue 
through “special assessments” to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue to 
support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the 
Origination Clause). 
96 See supra note 72. 
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
98 For discussion of the possible significance of the absence of the comma after the word 
“Debts,” see TRIBE, supra note 70, at 834, 834 n.2. See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES § 3.4, at 268 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the broad 
authority of Congress to tax and spend for the general welfare); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. 
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 5.7, at 523 (3d ed. 
2004] FINANCING OF PRIVATE CHOICE 875 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                  
General Welfare Clause, the Supreme Court historically has deferred to Congress.  
The Supreme Court in United States v. Butler,99 decided in 1936, interpreted the 
above-quoted language as empowering Congress to “lay taxes to provide for the 
general welfare” and viewed the spending power as congruent with the power to tax: 
The Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the general 
welfare. Funds in the Treasury as a result of taxation may be expended only through 
appropriation. (Article I, § 9, cl. 7). They can never accomplish the objects for 
which they were collected unless the power to appropriate is as broad as the power 
to tax. The necessary implication from the terms of the grant is that the public funds 
may be appropriated “to provide for the general welfare of the United States.”100
The Court in Butler then discussed the debate between Madison101 and 
Hamilton102 with regard to the scope of the spending power, and expressly adopted 
Hamilton’s more expansive views: 
Madison asserted it amounted to no more than a reference to the other powers 
enumerated in the subsequent clauses of the same section . . . . [I]n this view the 
phrase is merely tautology, for taxation and appropriation are or may be necessary 
incidents of the exercise of any of the enumerated legislative powers. Hamilton, on 
the other hand, maintained the clause confers a power separate and distinct form 
those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and 
Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited 
only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare 
of the United States. . . . Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, espouses the 
Hamiltonian position. . . . [We] conclude that the reading advocated by Mr. Justice 
Story is the correct one. While, therefore, the power to tax is not unlimited, its 
confines are set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of § 8 which bestow 
and define the legislative powers of the Congress. It results that the power of 
Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not 
limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.103
 
1999 & Supp. 2003) (stating that “[t]he constitutional power to spend is a condition imposed on the 
power to tax” and “the power to spend is coupled with the power to tax and is cast in terms of the 
power to tax ‘and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare’”). 
99 297 U.S. 1, 53–57, 68–78 (1936) (holding unconstitutional on Tenth Amendment grounds 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which authorized a tax on agricultural goods in order to 
fund emergency measures, such as paying some farmers to take their land out of production to 
stabilize farm product prices). 
100 Id. at 65. 
101 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison). 
102 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 30, 34 (Alexander Hamilton). 
103 Butler, 297 U.S. at 65–66. In addition, the Court quoted Hamilton for the proposition that 
“the purpose must be ‘general, and not local.’” Id. at 67. 
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The Butler Court thus rejected Madison’s view that the federal spending power 
was limited to subjects enumerated elsewhere in Article I, Section 8, and instead 
adopted Hamilton’s position that the spending power was a grant of independent 
authority. 
These general principles were reinforced the following year by the Court in two 
key cases, which upheld the constitutionality of the federal unemployment 
compensation system104 and old age pension program created by the Social Security 
Act.105 As Justice Cardozo stated in Helvering v. Davis,106 in which the Court held 
that the old age pension program did not violate the Tenth Amendment, the 
discretion to decide whether the objective of a particular program advances the 
general welfare rather than merely the interest of the directly benefited locality 
“belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary 
power, not an exercise of judgment.”107 The Court also emphasized that the concept 
was not “static”: “Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be 
interwoven in our day with the well-being of the Nation.”108 The Court upheld the 
social security tax on employers, the proceeds of which were intended to provide 
funds for payments to retired workers, in furtherance of the general welfare.109
Fifty years later, in South Dakota v. Dole,110 the Court reaffirmed the expansive 
scope of the spending power. Objectives not thought to be within the enumerated 
legislative powers “may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending 
power and the conditional grant of federal funds.”111 In Dole, the Court upheld a 
federal highway spending program that withheld five percent of otherwise available 
federal funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age, 
and adopted a multi-part test to determine whether federal spending conditions are 
constitutional.112
 
104 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937) (upholding a federal tax imposed 
on employers to provide unemployment benefits and a credit allowed for similar taxes paid to a 
state as a legitimate object of federal spending under the “general welfare” clause). Although 
Congress conditioned the credits upon compliance with regulations, the tax and the credit in 
combination were held to constitute inducement, not coercion, and as such did not violate the Tenth 
Amendment. Id. at 585–86. The Court held that the credit for state taxes bore a reasonable 
relationship “to the fiscal need” subserved by the tax in its normal operation, because state 
unemployment benefits would relieve the burden for direct relief by the national treasury. Id. at 
591. 
105 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (noting also that “[t]he line must still be 
drawn between one welfare and another, between particular and general”). 
106 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
107 Id. at 640. 
108 Id. at 641. 
109 Id. 
110 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
111 Id. at 207. 
112 Id. at 207–08, 212. 
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First, and most relevant to the discussion here, the Court noted that exercise of 
the spending power must be in pursuit of the “general welfare,” citing both Butler113 
and Helvering v. Davis.114 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
observed that “[i]n considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve 
general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of 
Congress.”115 He also noted that the Court has “questioned whether ‘general 
welfare’ is a judicially enforceable restriction at all.”116 Next, any conditions 
Congress imposes must be unambiguous so that each state can make an informed 
choice.117 Third, there must be a “nexus” between the area being regulated and the 
substance of the condition. That is, any conditions “might be illegitimate if they are 
unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”118 
Finally, a determination must be made as to whether any other constitutional 
provisions pose “an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.”119
The Court concluded that the legislation was designed to serve the general 
welfare as defined by Congress, that it met the clear statement requirement, the 
condition imposed was directly related to the federal highway spending goal of 
providing safe interstate travel, and that the Twenty-First Amendment did not bar 
congressional involvement through the use of the spending power.120 The Court thus 
upheld the condition on the federal grant, even though it assumed that Congress 
could not regulate drinking ages directly because of the explicit reservation of 
control over alcoholic beverages to the states under the Twenty-First Amendment. 
Despite the enforcement by the Rehnquist Court since Dole of federalism norms 
in various forms,121 the Court has not similarly qualified the scope of Congress’s 
 
113 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) 
114 301 U.S. at 640–41. 
115 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
116 Id. at 207 n.2 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1976) (per curiam)). In 
Buckley, the Court upheld the public financing of election campaigns, stating as follows: 
In this case, Congress was legislating for the “general welfare”—to reduce the deleterious 
influence of large contributions on our political process, to facilitate communication by 
candidates with the electorate, and to free candidates from the rigors of 
fundraising. . . . Whether the chosen means appear “bad,” “unwise,” or “unworkable” to us is 
irrelevant; Congress has concluded that the means are “necessary and proper” to promote the 
general welfare, and we thus decline to find this legislation without the grant of power in 
Article I, § 8. 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91. 
117 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 
(1981)). 
118 Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)). 
119 Id. at 208. 
120 Id. at 210–12. 
121 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607–19, 627 (2000) (Commerce 
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broad conditional spending power.122 Although the Court in Dole noted that 
Congress cannot enact spending conditions to induce the states to engage in 
unconstitutional acts123 or to coerce states into actions rather than offering them a 
choice,124 no clear limiting principle on the spending power has emerged since 
Dole.125
 
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925–
33 (1997) (Tenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–73 (1996) (Eleventh 
Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552–68 (1995) (Commerce Clause); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159–66 (1992) (Tenth Amendment). 
122 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173 (1992) (upholding conditional 
spending provisions as a permissible means of encouraging state action with respect to nuclear 
waste disposal). 
123 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–11 (giving as examples grants “conditioned on 
invidiously discriminatory state action or the inflicton of cruel and unusual punishment”). This 
restriction is aimed primarily at protecting individual rights, such as rights under the First or 
Fourteenth Amendments, from being violated and not states’ rights. Compare United States v. Am. 
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203–04 (2003) (per Rehnquist, C.J.) (citing Dole and upholding the 
Child Internet Protection Act, which requires libraries to use filter technology to block 
pornographic images on their computers or lose federal funding, as a valid exercise of the spending 
power) with Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547–49 (2001) (per Kennedy, J.) 
(holding that congressional restrictions on the use of federal funds for welfare reform activities by 
Legal Services Corporation grantees and their clients violates the First Amendment). 
124 The Court acknowledged that financial inducements offered by Congress may be “so 
coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 
(quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). However, no post-Dole spending 
condition has been invalidated on that ground. 
In the Eleventh Amendment context, Justice Scalia has drawn a distinction between Congress 
threatening a “sanction” and a “denial of a gift or gratuity” if the state refuses to agree to its 
condition. See Coll. Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 687 (1999) (per Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (acknowledging that such a distinction 
could disappear where the gift withheld is substantial enough, but explaining that “where the 
constitutionally guaranteed protection of the States' sovereign immunity is involved, the point of 
coercion is automatically passed—and the voluntariness of waiver destroyed—when what is 
attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity”). Thus, 
the Court found no voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity when a state merely engaged in 
commercial activities regulated under a federal law, which provided that states are subject to suit in 
federal court for false or misleading advertising in connection with those activities. Id. 
(distinguishing such situations from the waiver of immunity that may be found in the state’s 
acceptance of a federal grant). 
125 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 70, at 839 (observing that “the scope of the spending power 
would seem to extend to virtually any secular activity”); Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress’s 
Power under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 
765 (2003) (explaining that the most direct approach to adopting a limiting principle “would simply 
be for the Court to employ the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and rule that Congress cannot 
use a carrot to accomplish what it is forbidden to do with a stick”). Professor Choper criticizes the 
suggested distinction made by Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Dole, between conditions 
that only generally relate to the purposes of Congress’s grant and conditions that expressly specify 
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In sum, although the courts have enforced some limits on the taxing and 
spending powers, they have largely left to the political process the determination of 
whether federal legislation advances public purposes under the General Welfare 
Clause. In defining revenue provisions, both Origination Clause and Export Clause 
cases draw distinctions between individually financed “user fees” and collectively 
financed “general revenues.” On the spending side, Congress has a great deal of 
latitude in determining whether a particular expenditure serves “public” purposes. 
Constitutionally required enactment procedures126 provide democratic 
legitimacy for Congress’s taxing and spending decisions.127 These decision-making 
procedures apply to all legislation, whether Congress is raising or lowering taxes, 
enacting targeted tax incentives, or appropriating funds.128 Other democratic values, 
including transparency and accountability, depend upon the availability of 
information about and public understanding of those decisions.129
III. TRANSPARENCY: TAX AND BUDGET POLITICS 
 Taxation generally determines the level of collective financing of goods and 
services, whether produced and delivered by government employees or purchased 
 
how the money should be spent, arguing that it is “just as malleable as other potentially limiting 
principles.” Id. at 766. 
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (bicameralism and presentment); see, e.g., Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438–40 (1998); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (observing that the Article I power to enact statutes may only “be exercised in 
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure”). 
127 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 428 (1819) (observing that security against the 
abuse of the taxing power is found in “the structure of government itself” and that in imposing a 
tax, the legislature “acts upon its constituents,” which provides in general “a sufficient security 
against erroneous and oppressive taxation”). 
128 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”). See also 
Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1937) (recognizing the wide 
discretion of Congress in making general appropriations of amounts to be expended as directed by 
designated government agencies). For a discussion of congressional budget authority outside of 
annual “appropriations” acts, including contract authority, borrowing authority, and entitlement 
authority, see Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 595, 605–09 (1988) (“Entitlements, such as formula grant programs for 
individuals and other entities, usually are permanently appropriated and may be funded either from 
trust fund receipts . . . or general revenues.”) (footnote omitted); see also Charles Tiefer, 
“Budgetized” Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress’s 1995-1996 Budget 
Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 416 (1996). 
129 E.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 (1971) (stating that a condition for a 
concept of right is publicity and explaining that “[t]he point of the publicity condition is to have the 
parties evaluate conceptions of justice as publicly acknowledged and fully effective moral 
constitutions of social life”). 
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from the private sector. The use of tax incentives serves privatization goals by 
providing more market-based private sector production alternatives. However, 
targeted tax incentives result in revenue losses, which may be offset by higher tax 
rates generally, higher governmental borrowing costs from increased deficit levels, 
or by spending cuts. 
The characterization of taxing and spending decisions influences public debate. 
It matters politically whether tax incentives are viewed as equivalent to collectively 
financed but privately provided goods or services; or instead, as equivalent to 
general tax reduction. The recent re-examination of the tax expenditure budget by 
the Bush Administration illustrates the political dynamics at play.130
Although much of the tax code is designed to raise revenue or to accomplish 
specific tax policy objectives, some tax provisions are identified as “tax 
expenditures” by the Treasury131 and by Congress.132 Under tax expenditure 
analysis, tax expenditures are categorized as subsidies or as spending provisions (in 
the form of foregone revenue), rather than as income measurement or revenue 
raising provisions.133 Tax expenditures may be in the form of exclusions, 
exemptions, deductions, credits, deferrals, or special tax rates. Many targeted tax 
incentives currently are identified in the budget process as “tax expenditures” and, 
thus, are identified conceptually with the use of public resources. Tax expenditures 
are listed for informational purposes as equivalent to governmental expenditures, 
listed by reference to federal funding categories.134
 
130 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
131 Treasury published its first tax expenditure analysis in 1968, under the leadership of 
Harvard Law School Professor Stanley S. Surrey, who served as Assistant Secretary of Treasury 
for Tax Policy from 1961 to 1969. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 
30, 1968, DOC. NO. 3245, 35–36, 322 ex. 29 (1969); see also Jonathan Barry Forman, Origins of 
the Tax Expenditure Budget, 30 TAX NOTES 537, 537–38 (1986); Erwin N. Griswold, A True 
Public Servant, 98 HARV. L. REV. 329 (1984) (describing Surrey’s academic and public service 
achievements). Currently, Treasury’s tax expenditure budget appears in the ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES portion of the President’s annual budget submission to Congress. See BUDGET, FY 
2004, supra note 59, at 101. 
132 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2004–2008 (JCS-8-03) 1 & n.2 (2003) [hereinafter J. COMM. 
TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2004–2008] (listing prior reports beginning in 1972, and 
containing current tax expenditure estimates prepared for the House Committee on Ways and 
Means and the Senate Committee on Finance, and submitted also to the House and Senate 
Committees on the Budget); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2002–2006 (JCA-1-02) 1 & n.2 (2002) [hereinafter J. COMM. 
TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2002–2006]. 
133 See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1156 
(discussing how tax expenditures function as government subsidies). For further discussion of the 
tax expenditure concept, see discussion infra Part III.B. 
134 Tax incentives are listed as “expenditures” in annual budget submissions to Congress. See 
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The following subsections describe the objections to the tax expenditure concept 
raised in the Bush Administration’s budget submissions, briefly explain the history 
of the tax expenditure concept, and provide an analysis of the ownership and tax 
base issues underlying the Administration’s reconsideration of the tax expenditure 
budget. 
A. Reconsideration in Progress 
The Bush Administration’s first budget, submitted to Congress in April 2001, 
announced a controversial reconsideration of the tax expenditure concept.135 The 
budget submission questioned the value of tax expenditure analysis on both 
ideological and technical grounds.136 The ideologically based objection highlighted 
key assumptions underlying the tax expenditure concept: that the government would 
“otherwise collect additional revenues but for these provisions” and that these 
revenues constitute a “resource to be spent.”137 Technical objections questioned the 
income tax baseline used to determine the tax expenditure list. The Bush budget 
criticized the current income tax baseline for its arbitrariness and its “breadth.”138 
Although it was impossible to tell from its first budget submission whether the Bush 
Administration’s reconsideration would lead to the rejection of the tax expenditure 
concept or to other less drastic changes in budget presentations made in the future, 
some initial observations by Treasury officials suggested that the changes being 
 
discussion infra Part III.B. 
135 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 61 (2001), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/spec.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET, FY 
2002]. See Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 603, 603–04 (2003) (noting that by including the announcement “President Bush sparked a 
minor firestorm within the Beltway” and that it sounded to many “like an opening salvo in a battle” 
to eliminate the tax expenditure listings in the budget). 
136 The Bush Administration’s first budget submission explained the need for reconsideration 
of the tax expenditure concept as follows: 
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-344) requires that a list of “tax 
expenditures” be included in the budget. So-called tax expenditures may be defined as 
provisions of the Federal tax laws with exclusions, exemptions, deductions, credits deferrals, 
or special tax rates. Underlying the “tax expenditure” concept is the notion that the Federal 
Government would otherwise collect additional revenues but for these provisions. It assumes 
an arbitrary tax base is available to the Government in its entirety as a resource to be spent. 
Because of the breadth of this arbitrary tax base, the Administration believes that the concept 
of “tax expenditure” is of questionable analytic value. The discussion below is based on 
materials and formats developed and included in previous budgets. The Administration 
intends to reconsider this presentation in the future. 
BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 61. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
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considered related to the tax baseline used in tax expenditure analysis.139
The Bush Administration’s second budget, submitted to Congress in 2002, 
confirmed those initial indications and provided a more complete description of the 
ongoing reconsideration of the tax expenditure presentation in the budget.140 
According to the Administration’s second budget submission, the re-evaluation and 
revision efforts by Treasury would focus on three main tax baseline-related issues: 1) 
a redefinition of the baseline income concept “to be more consistent with a 
comprehensive income tax base”; 2) consideration of issues involved in estimating 
“negative” tax expenditures in addition to the current list of positive tax 
expenditures; and 3) consideration of “estimating tax expenditures relative to a 
hypothetical consumption tax, as well as to an income tax.”141 The study would 
consider “possible revisions and improvements in methodology and approach.”142 In 
addition, the second budget submission stepped back somewhat from the first 
budget’s criticism by acknowledging that “[t]hough imperfect, the tax expenditure 
budget has expanded our understanding of policy programs operating through the 
Federal income tax and, more generally, the workings of the Federal income tax.”143
 
139 Id. at 76 (noting that “[a] tax expenditure is an exception to the baseline provisions of the 
tax structure” and that “[t]he 1974 Congressional Budget Act did not specify the baseline 
provisions of the tax law”); see Heidi Glenn, Bush Administration Questions Value of Tax 
Expenditures List, 91 TAX NOTES 535, 535 (2001) (reporting that the Treasury Department is 
conducting a periodic review into what should be considered a “normal tax system,” and quoting 
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Mark A. Weinberger, as observing that our tax system 
is “really a hybrid tax, a mixture of income and consumption based systems” and “we’re going to 
look at whether the definition has to be modernized as to what is a normal system and what is a 
deviation from it”). 
140 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 95–97 (2002), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/spec.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET, FY 
2003]. 
141 Id. at 96–97. The concept of “negative tax expenditures” is related to the notion of a tax 
penalty. For example, a statutory limitation on the deduction of economic losses or other business 
costs would be inconsistent with an income tax, and thus could be classified as “negative” tax 
expenditure. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 67 (2004) (providing a 2% floor on miscellaneous itemized 
deductions). 
142 BUDGET, FY 2003, supra note 140, at 96. 
143 Id. at 95. The budget submission explains the statutory requirement that the annual federal 
budget presentation include a list of “tax expenditures” as follows: 
Policymakers and researchers have long recognized that certain income tax code 
provisions have policy purposes other than simply raising revenue and that it is useful to 
understand better the nature of these provisions. It is important to know the amounts of 
revenue associated with them, whether they are achieving desired results, and their 
consequences for the economy. The answers to these questions are important simply as a 
source of information, but also so that policymakers and the public can review these features 
of the income tax regularly to see if change is warranted. 
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The Administration’s next two budgets, submitted in 2003 and 2004, contained 
the initial results of Treasury’s ongoing study of each of the above-mentioned 
baseline issues, as well as revised estimates of selected tax expenditures.144 The 
Treasury review summarized differences between “official” tax expenditures and 
those based on a comprehensive income tax,145 included a discussion of negative tax 
expenditures,146 and provided an analysis of categories of tax expenditures under a 
theoretical consumption-based tax.147 In addition, it explained its new methodology 
for revised estimates of selected tax expenditures, including lowered estimates for 
accelerated depreciation.148
The last major tax baseline change to the tax expenditure budget was proposed 
by Treasury early in the Reagan Administration,149 and was later adopted by that 
Administration in a somewhat diluted form.150 The Bush Administration 
reconsideration echoed some of the concerns expressed about the tax baseline that 
prompted the modifications adopted over two decades ago.151 Before turning to a 
 
Id. at 95. 
144 BUDGET, FY 2004, supra note 59, at 130–40. The study is reproduced in updated form in 
the budget submitted to Congress in February 2004. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 314–25 (2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/spec.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET, FY 2005]. 
145 The review concludes that “[m]ost large tax expenditures would continue to be tax 
expenditures were the baseline taken to be comprehensive income, although some would not.” 
BUDGET, FY 2004, supra note 59, at 130. 
146 The FY 2004 budget documents define negative tax expenditures as “provisions that cause 
taxpayers to pay too much tax.” Id. at 133 (providing examples, including the corporate income tax 
and passive loss rule restrictions on deductions of capital losses). 
147 Id. at 134–37. 
148 The new methodology for estimating the tax expenditure from accelerated depreciation 
uses replacement cost rather than historic cost and approximates “the degree of acceleration 
provided by current law over a baseline determined by real, inflation adjusted, economic 
depreciation.” Id. at 138. Under the new methodology, the new estimates “are smaller” than the old 
baseline depreciation estimates. Id. In addition, the review provides an alternative estimate of the 
tax expenditure resulting from the tax exemption of the return earned on owner-occupied housing. 
149 See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
150 See Martin A. Sullivan, Administration Reignites Old Battle Over Tax Expenditures, 91 
TAX NOTES 701, 702 (2001) (describing the attempt by Treasury Under Secretary for Tax and 
Economic Affairs Norman B. Ture to “completely overhaul” the tax expenditure budget early in 
the Reagan administration and explaining the resistance to Ture’s proposals by the Office of 
Management and Budget). According to Sullivan, “OMB officials thought it might be politically 
insensitive for Treasury to be suggesting corporations were overtaxed when generous depreciation 
allowances and controversial leasing provisions were rapidly shrinking the corporate tax burden” 
and “OMB recognized that any critique of the tax expenditures budget could backfire on the 
administration if—as came to pass later in 1982—it sought reductions in tax expenditures to reduce 
the deficit.” Id. 
151 The Bush Administration’s reconsideration of the tax expenditure concept revisits some of 
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more complete discussion of the implications of the Bush Administration’s 
reconsideration, the next section describes the development of tax expenditure theory 
and its impact on congressional tax and budgetary decision making. Those familiar 
with this history might wish to proceed to the following section. 
B. The Tax Expenditure Concept: Some Background 
As explained by the leading tax expenditure theorists, tax expenditures involve 
“the imputed tax payment that would have been made in the absence of the special 
tax provision (all else remaining the same) and the simultaneous expenditure of that 
payment as a direct grant to the person [or business] benefited by the special 
provision.”152 Tax expenditure theory divides the tax code into two elements: (1) 
provisions needed to implement the “normal tax structure,” and (2) “special 
preferences.”153
A central insight of the tax expenditure concept is that financial assistance can 
be delivered to a particular industry, activity, or class of persons through the tax 
 
the core objections to the tax expenditure budget raised in 1981 by Norman Ture, Undersecretary 
of the Treasury for Tax and Economic Affairs. Ture’s objections led to the adoption of a modified 
reference tax baseline by the Reagan administration. His views were not adopted in full, however. 
The Office of Management and Budget refused to clear his proposed testimony on tax expenditures 
before the Senate Budget Committee in November 1981, and his appearance before the committee 
was cancelled. However, a copy of his undelivered testimony later appeared in print. See Ture’s 
Unreleased Testimony on Tax Expenditures, 13 TAX NOTES 1535, 1535–39 (Dec. 21, 1981) 
(arguing for use of a “neutrality” standard, leading to a consumption tax base); see also Bruce 
Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them?, 92 TAX NOTES 413, 419–21 (July 16, 
2001) (arguing in favor of the Bush Administration’s reconsideration and suggesting that it may be 
laying the intellectual groundwork for a tax reform proposal that would shift the tax code toward a 
consumption base). 
152 STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 
6–7 (1973). 
153 STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985) [hereinafter 
SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES]. Professors Surrey and McDaniels have explained the 
tax expenditure concept as follows: 
The tax expenditure concept posits that an income tax is composed of two distinct 
elements. The first element consists of structural provisions necessary to implement a normal 
income tax, such as the definition of net income, the specification of accounting rules, the 
determination of the entities subject to tax, the determination of the rate schedule and 
exemption levels, and the application of the tax to international transactions. These provisions 
compose the revenue-raising aspects of the tax. The second element consists of the special 
preferences found in every income tax. These provisions, often called tax incentives or tax 
subsidies, are departures from the normal tax structure and are designed to favor a particular 
industry, activity, or class of persons. . . . [T]hese departures from the normative tax structure 
represent government spending for favored activities or groups, effected through the tax 
system . . . . 
Id. 
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system. The financial assistance may take the form of permanent exclusions from 
income, deductions, deferrals of tax liabilities, credits against tax, or special tax 
rates.154 Tax expenditures are viewed as functionally equivalent to spending 
programs because they reduce the revenue that would otherwise be collected absent 
the tax expenditure provision. Beneficiaries of a tax preference are viewed as having 
received a government grant or appropriation equal to the amount of the tax 
reduction due to the preference.155 Thus, in addition to its revenue-raising function, 
the tax system can be used as a delivery mechanism for government programs. The 
funding for the programs comes in the form of refunds from, or reductions in, tax 
otherwise due, rather than from congressional appropriations.156
Once a provision is identified as a “tax expenditure,” tax expenditure theorists 
urge policymakers to consider whether financial assistance is warranted and, if so, to 
determine whether a direct government grant or a tax expenditure would provide a 
better framework in which to provide government assistance.157 Fewer tax 
expenditures in the tax code, some theorists argue, would lead to a more equitable, 
more efficient, and more administrable tax system and, thus, to better tax policy.158 
The tax reform project of tax expenditure theorists, therefore, initially combined the 
related goals of achieving a more comprehensive income-measuring tax base with 
 
154 Id. 
155 Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A 
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706 (1970). 
156 Toder, supra note 57, at 363. Although conceptually similar to “spending,” tax 
expenditures do not generally involve a direct outlay of funds, with the exception of certain 
refundable tax credits such as the earned income tax credit. The foregone revenue from “tax 
expenditures” need not be “appropriated” by Congress. See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the 
Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1359 (1988) (“While as a matter of policy Congress may want to treat 
tax expenditures as equivalent to government spending, the Constitution does not require any such 
treatment.”) (footnote omitted). 
157 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 153, at 99–117. Tax 
expenditures are sometimes viewed as less bureaucratic or more cost effective than developing a 
new spending program. Often, however, tax expenditures are enacted to supplement existing 
discretionary spending programs, and as pointed out by tax expenditure theorists, tax expenditures 
increase the enforcement and administrative burdens of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue 
Service. 
158 Id. at 25–27. The tax reform strategy of eliminating tax expenditures from the tax code 
may not work well in today’s world, as Gene Steuerle has argued: 
We have moved to a world where it is increasingly harder to separate tax and spending 
issues. . . . Those concerned with coming up with a cleaner, more efficient, and more 
administrable tax system, therefore, may need to change strategy. The purist cannot claim to 
be pure by keeping outlay types of issues off of the table. A long-term strategy—admittedly 
difficult—might be to figure out some way Congress more easily could consider outlay and 
tax issues simultaneously when a major tax (or outlay) bill is being considered. 
Gene Steuerle, The Merger of Tax & Expenditure Policy in the 2001 Tax Legislation, 92 TAX 
NOTES 291, 292 (2001). 
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the elimination, whenever feasible, of tax expenditures from the tax code.159
Tax scholars have extensively debated issues related to defining and measuring 
“tax expenditures.”160 Much of the controversy about tax expenditure analysis has 
focused on the difficulty of distinguishing “tax preferences” from “normal” or 
structural tax provisions deemed necessary to define the income tax base.161 There is 
no precise definition of the income tax baseline or the exceptions to it. As Professor 
Boris Bittker explained, in responding to the suggestion that we should lean over 
backward to avoid tax preferences, “in the absence of a generally acceptable or 
scientifically determinable vertical, we cannot know whether we are leaning 
backward or forward.”162
Some scholars have suggested ways of addressing the definitional issues, 
ranging from narrowly confining the tax expenditure list to those universally 
recognized as spending programs, to broadly including all arguable tax expenditures, 
or to a more middle ground position of redefining tax expenditures as “substitutable” 
tax provisions—that is, to those provisions that could be easily substituted by direct 
expenditure programs because they do not serve significant tax-related functions.163
The tax expenditure concept has also generated political controversy. Some 
business representatives immediately rejected the asserted equivalence between tax 
preferences and direct government outlays, arguing that tax expenditure analysis 
 
159 Comprehensive tax base proposals and the tax expenditure concept do not completely 
overlap, having some different antecedents and proponents, but they are related to the extent that 
they both seek to broaden the income tax base. Cf. Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax 
Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 244, 251 (1969). 
160 For an early discussion of these issues, see id.; Boris I. Bittker, The Tax Expenditure 
Budget—A Reply to Professors Surrey and Hellmuth, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 538 (1969); Stanley S. 
Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget—Response to Professor Bittker, 22 
NAT’L TAX J. 528 (1969). 
161 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 309, 313 (1972) (examining whether certain personal deductions can be seen as a refinement 
of ideal income); Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 934 (1967) [hereinafter Bittker, Comprehensive Tax Base] (criticizing the 
internal inconsistencies and individual judgments made by Surrey’s income tax baseline); Thomas 
D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deduction in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 344–45 
(1989) (evaluating the different models of personal deductions applied by Surrey, Andrews, and 
Kelman); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” 
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 835 
(1979) (criticizing Andrews’ analysis and proposing an alternative net income tax base). 
162 Bittker, Comprehensive Tax Base, supra note 161, at 985. 
163 Michael J. McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 79, 82–83, 88–89 (1980) (proposing a methodology for identifying tax expenditures 
that would bypass problems of defining the normal tax structure); Thuronyi, supra note 133, at 
1163–70, 1181–82, 1186–87 (summarizing the definitional issues and arguing that substitutable tax 
provisions can be classified by identifying the significant purposes of the provision and then by 
determining whether a non-tax program could serve those purposes equally well). 
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“rests on the presumption that government has a preeminent claim on income and 
resources” and that tax incentives instead properly acknowledge the productive 
owner’s “prior, even natural, ownership claim to that income.”164 Some members of 
Congress similarly have been skeptical of treating tax expenditures as equivalent to 
spending programs. Elimination of tax expenditures is perceived by them to be a tax 
increase, thus politically difficult unless combined with a highly visible rate 
reduction or some other popular offset.165
Despite the theoretical and political difficulties with defining tax expenditures, 
Congress has required the listing of tax expenditures as part of the budget process 
since 1974.166 The tax expenditure budget is used primarily for information 
purposes, to help policymakers determine the “relative merits of achieving specified 
public goals through tax benefits or direct outlays.”167 Both Congress and Treasury 
prepare lists of tax expenditures organized according to budget functions.168 
However, currently, they each use slightly different tax baselines in defining tax 
expenditures. 
During the Reagan Administration,169 the Treasury developed a baseline 
 
164 Carl H. Madden & James R. Morris, Tax Incentives: Employment and Training of the 
Disadvantaged, in TAX INCENTIVES, SYMPOSIUM CONDUCTED BY THE TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, 
NOV. 20–21, 1969, at 231, 234–45 (by economic analysts employed by the Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States). 
165 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the 
Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1998) [hereinafter Garrett, Offset Requirements]; 
Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1995). 
166 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(3), 
88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.) (defining “tax 
expenditures” as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a 
special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a 
preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability”). 
167 J. COMM. TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2004–2008, supra note 132, at 2. 
168 Tax expenditures are listed according to their budget function, in budget categories such as 
national defense, agriculture, housing and commerce, education, and income security. The tax 
credit for production of non-conventional or alternative fuels, for example, is found under the 
budget category for “energy.” BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 63 tbl.5-1; J. COMM. TAX 
EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2004-2008, supra note 132, at 20–21 tbl.1. 
169 The Bush Administration’s fiscal 2002 budget revisited themes introduced twenty years 
earlier in the Reagan Administration’s tax expenditure budget presentation. See OFFICE OF MGMT. 
& BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: 
FISCAL YEAR 1983: SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, at 1 (1982) [hereinafter BUDGET, FY 1983: SPECIAL 
ANALYSIS G] (“The very term ‘tax expenditure’ is misleading in several respects, and there are 
formidable difficulties in trying to define the underlying concept or to measure the effect of 
‘special’ tax provisions.”). 
The Reagan Administration’s tax expenditure budget was criticized as departing from the tax 
expenditure concept and from standards established by the Budget Act of 1974. See Paul R. 
McDaniel & Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Expenditures: How to Identify Them; How to Control Them, 
15 TAX NOTES 595, 595–601 (1982) [hereinafter McDaniel & Surrey, Tax Expenditures]; see also 
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different from the standard used by the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation. 
Under the Joint Committee’s approach, tax expenditures have generally been defined 
by reference to a modified normative tax base. The normative model is based on the 
Haig-Simons economic definition of income,170 modified in several important 
respects.171 Due to practical administrative concerns, the model excludes unrealized 
gains and losses, imputed income from services provided by owner-occupied homes 
and durable goods, and inflation adjustments.172 In addition, it generally assumes the 
classical system of taxing most corporations on their income separately from the 
taxation of shareholders.173
Under the “reference tax” baseline adopted by Treasury during the Reagan 
Administration, a provision is treated as a tax expenditure only if it constitutes an 
exception from some general rule stated in the law.174 For example, the Treasury 
omitted accelerated depreciation from the tax expenditure list because accelerated 
depreciation had been the general rule since 1981, not the exception.175 Treasury’s 
reference tax baseline was criticized as overly politicizing the tax expenditure 
 
Sullivan, supra note 150, at 702. 
170 HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938) (“Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of 
(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store 
of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.”); Robert Murray Haig, 
The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert 
Murray Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in AM. ECON. ASS’N, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
TAXATION 59 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959) (“Income is the money value of 
the net accretion to one’s economic power between two points of time.”). 
171 Past reports prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee have discussed the normative 
model. By contrast, more recent reports simply state that “[t]he determination of whether a 
provision is a tax expenditure is made on the basis of a broad concept of income that is larger in 
scope than ‘income’ as defined under general U.S. income tax principles.” J. COMM. TAX 
EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2004–2008, supra note 132, at 2; accord J. COMM. TAX 
EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2002–2006, supra note 132, at 2. For this reason, the report 
notes, the tax expenditure list includes estimates for “the net exclusion of pension contributions and 
earnings, the exclusion of extraterritorial income, as well as other exclusions, notwithstanding that 
such exclusions define income under the general rule of U.S. income taxation.” Id. at n.6. 
172 J. COMM. TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2004–2008, supra note 132, at 5. 
173 Id. at 7. 
174 See BUDGET, FY 1983: SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 169, at 5 (stating that “[f]or a 
provision to involve a tax subsidy, two conditions are necessary:—The provision must be ‘special’ 
in that it applies to a narrow class of transactions or taxpayers; and—There must be a ‘general’ 
provision to which the ‘special’ provision is a clear exception”). 
175 See id. at 6–7. In addition, the “reference” tax baseline differs in its treatment of the 
corporate tax graduated rate structure (the lower rates are not treated as tax expenditures), the 
exclusion from income of government transfer payments (not treated as tax expenditures), and the 
deferral of tax on income from controlled foreign corporations (not treated as a tax expenditure). 
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budget176 and defended as avoiding many of the judgments made under the 
normative approach.177 However, the two different approaches do not currently 
result in major differences in the tax expenditures listed; with some exceptions, the 
Treasury and Joint Committee lists have been roughly similar since 1986.178
As a tax reform effort, tax expenditure analysis has had mixed results. Some 
reforms suggested by tax expenditure theorists have been adopted, including the 
listing of tax expenditures in the budget since 1974,179 the movement toward a more 
comprehensive tax base with the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,180 and 
the adoption in 1990 of certain budgetary restrictions on new tax preferences.181 
 
176 SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 153, at 595; Linda Sugin, Tax 
Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 424–27 (1999). 
177 Thuronyi, supra note 133, at 1182–86. 
178 For the Joint Committee’s comparisons with Treasury’s list of tax expenditures, see J. 
COMM. TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2004–2008, supra note 132, at 1, 13–16 (noting, for 
example, that Treasury’s list contains a section that lists estate and gift tax provisions considered to 
be tax expenditures but that the Joint Committee includes only provisions outside of the normal 
income tax structure). 
179 See supra notes 136 and 166 and accompanying text. 
180 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended 
beginning at 26 U.S.C. § 1); see 1 OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM 
FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT vii (1984) (discussing proposal to reform the income tax system); see also 
TIMOTHY J. CONLAN ET AL., TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM 45–80, 242–44 
(1990) (describing the role played by tax policy experts in developing the concept of 
comprehensive tax reform); John F. Witte, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: A New Era in Tax 
Politics?, 19 AM. POL. Q. 438, 443 (1991) (stating that “[s]eventy-two provisions tightened tax 
expenditures, including 14 that involved complete repeal, a figure approximately equal to the total 
number of tax expenditures that had been repealed from 1913 through 1985"). But cf. Thuronyi, 
supra note 133, at 1176–77 (finding only one instance in which the 1986 Act substituted a direct 
expenditure for a repealed provision, i.e., the amendment of the Social Security Act to provide 
federal spending support for expenses of adopting children with special needs in place of an 
itemized tax deduction for such expenses). 
181 In 1990, federal budget legislation required that certain new tax benefits be offset by tax 
increases, cuts in other tax expenditures, or cuts in entitlement programs. See Budget Enforcement 
Act of 1990, Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 
104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (establishing “pay-as-you-
go” [hereinafter PAYGO] budget requirement that tax changes resulting in revenue loss be paid for 
by tax increases, by reductions in current tax subsidies, or by certain direct spending reductions in 
entitlement programs). Although nominally in effect through 2002, the rules had little impact since 
the late 1990s. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 10201–205, 111 Stat. 
251, 697–702 (extending discretionary spending limits and PAYGO requirements until October 1, 
2002, and to 2003 for expenditures for highways and mass transit). In later years, Congress 
bypassed or waived the requirements. See, e.g., BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 243 (stating 
that “Congress and the previous Administration began to skirt the budget enforcement 
mechanisms” after the reporting of budget surpluses in 1998); Warren Rojas, Budget Heads Say 
PAYGO, Spending Caps Need Updating, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY, LEXIS 2001 TNT 125-2, June 
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However, much of the tax expenditure reform agenda was never implemented. 
Relatively few tax expenditures identified since 1974 have been eliminated from the 
tax code. Since 1986, tax expenditures have grown again in both in number and in 
their overall budgetary impact.182 During the 1990s, the trend was toward 
substitution of discretionary spending with tax expenditures.183 During that period, 
tax scholars also began shifting their focus from the theory’s definitional problems to 
its insight that the tax system could function as a delivery mechanism for financial 
assistance, utilizing that institutional insight to analyze the tax system within the 
overall governmental tax and transfer system.184
C. Public Resources v. Private Ownership 
 
27, 2001 (reporting that Dan L. Crippen, director of the Congressional Budget Office, told House 
Budget Committee members that the $1.35 trillion tax cut enacted in 2001 had already been added 
to the PAYGO scorecard and would likely be waived because of the surplus). See discussion infra 
Part IV.A. 
182 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, NO. 122, TAX POLICY: TAX EXPENDITURES DESERVE MORE 
SCRUTINY 17 fig.1.1, 35–37 (1994) (finding an upward trend in the total number of tax 
expenditures and in Joint Committee on Taxation estimates of aggregate tax expenditure revenue 
losses from 1974 to 1986, a downward trend in revenue losses after implementation of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, followed by another trend upward in the 1990s approaching the high point of 
revenue losses in the 1980s); accord STEUERLE, supra note 40, at 43 fig.3.2, Trends in Tax 
Expenditures, 1980–2003 (showing tax expenditures peaking at about 8% of GDP in 1985, 
dropping to 5.6% in 1990, and increasing to about 6.5% of GDP in 2003). 
183 See, e.g., Toder, supra note 57, at 361–62; Sugin, supra note 176, at 408 (noting that the 
federal government spent more money through the Code in 1998 than through the discretionary 
appropriations process and that the “tax law’s traditional revenue-raising function is being eclipsed 
as it becomes a principal tool of federal policy”); see also Leonard E. Burman, Surplus Tax 
Policy?, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 405, 409 (1999) (explaining that “budget rules create a strong incentive 
to channel new spending through the tax side of the budget”). See generally CHRISTOPHER 
HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 190 (1997) (observing that, since the links between tax expenditures and direct 
expenditures were recognized by policymakers in the 1970s, the “most common response” by 
moderate Republicans and conservative Democrats “has been to use tax expenditures as a means of 
slowing the growth or preventing the creation of traditional social programs”). 
184 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 977 (2004) (observing that “[o]nce definitions are put aside, the tax 
expenditures question really is the integration question” and considering integration from an 
organizational institutional design framework of specialization and coordination, using the earned 
income tax credit and food stamp programs as examples); Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax 
Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 564–70 (1995) 
(examining the institutional advantages and disadvantages of tax and transfer integration, using the 
earned income tax credit as an example of tax-based welfare reform); see also, e.g., Mary L. Heen, 
Welfare Reform, Child Care Costs, and Taxes: Delivering Increased Work-Related Child Care 
Benefits to Low-Income Families, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 210–16 (1995) (considering 
taxing and spending programs related to work-related child care benefits for low-income families). 
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The idea that tax incentives “subsidize” private behavior with public resources 
provokes strong objections in some quarters. According to those who reject the 
concept of tax expenditures, a tax incentive cannot be viewed as a “subsidy” because 
the money that would have gone to the government in the form of taxes belongs to 
the taxpayer in the first instance.185 Under this view, a tax incentive or tax preference 
is equivalent to a tax cut. Even if it is not an across-the-board rate decrease but is 
instead a tax break targeted to benefit certain individual taxpayers or industries, such 
a tax break returns money to the people’s pockets or to the industries’ bottom line. 
This viewpoint also presumes that tax incentives are largely self-administered by 
taxpayers and, thus, permit less government involvement. The asserted equivalence 
between tax preferences and tax cuts makes the use of tax incentives conceptually 
consistent with an effort to limit or downsize government. 
According to a contrary view, as articulated by tax expenditure theorists, and as 
currently applied under federal budgetary requirements, a tax incentive that departs 
from the “normal” revenue-raising income tax structure or income tax base 
constitutes a “tax expenditure.” As acknowledged in the tax expenditure budget, the 
tax system plays a role as a funding and delivery mechanism for certain government 
programs in addition to its revenue-raising function. 
Although tax expenditures are less transparent as budgetary items than 
appropriations, tax expenditure theorists argue that their use does not necessarily 
result in smaller government. Tax expenditures create additional management 
burdens on the tax system and administrators, requiring tax administrators to issue 
regulations, rulings, and conduct audits of “spending” programs outside their basic 
area of expertise.186
Tax expenditure theory distinguishes between across-the-board tax cuts and 
targeted tax breaks. Because the tax rate structure is viewed as part of the “normal” 
income tax structure by tax expenditure theorists, an across-the-board tax rate 
reduction would not be classified as a “tax expenditure.” By contrast, a special tax 
 
185 See The $91 Billion Loophole, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1975, at 22 (objecting to the tax 
expenditure concept): 
As we all should know by now, or at least should learn by 1984, nothing any of us earn 
really belongs to us. Everything belongs to the federal government. . . . The idea, we suppose, 
is that maybe the government would do a better job of keeping this money and spending it 
directly. To look at it this way, maybe we’d be better off if the government kept all of what 
really belongs to it, $1.3 trillion of personal income, and made all our purchases for us. Now 
there’s a loophole. 
Id. 
186 SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 153.; see, e.g., Alstott, supra  note 
184, at 546–70; Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income 
Housing Credit, 38 VILL. L. REV. 871, 874–909 (1993); George K. Yin et al., Improving the 
Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit 
Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 225 (1994). 
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deduction, credit, or rate applied to the profits of certain industries (from oil 
exploration, for example) would be classified as a tax expenditure. Such preferences 
or incentives generally violate the tax norms of equity and neutrality. However, 
because they serve an expenditure function, not a revenue-raising tax function,187 tax 
expenditure theorists argue that they should be evaluated using criteria applicable to 
other government spending programs. 
The differing views of ownership and “subsidy” in the debate about tax 
expenditures obscure underlying disagreements about the role of government and 
how its costs should be allocated. The debate masks a basic disagreement about the 
scope of the government’s power to tax. 
Drawing the line between public and private resources by reference to 
“ownership” suggests a continuing entitlement to the fruits of one’s labor or 
property188 and a rejection of the government’s coercive power to collect funds for 
redistributive purposes.189 If one accepts the government’s power to tax for such 
purposes, however, the notion of private ownership loses its force in this context. 
The issues instead center on choices regarding the provision of public goods, 
distributive justice, and the collective financing of certain redistributive 
governmental programs rather than on preserving pretax distributions of 
resources.190
The more pertinent question becomes how the political system defines the tax 
base to secure certain social outcomes, and how it determines what each individual 
or business must transfer to the public sector. The practical question of whether the 
funds are actually collected by the government and then disbursed through spending 
programs, or whether the collection step is skipped by virtue of a special tax break 
for a particular individual or industry so that a benefit can be delivered through the 
tax system, raises issues of administration, management, and legislative process 
rather than of political or philosophical justifications for the government’s power to 
tax. 
D. The Tax Baseline in a Hybrid Tax World 
Although the conflicting views about private ownership and public subsidies 
 
187 See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing cases interpreting the Origination Clause, 
which requires that all bills for “raising revenue” originate in the House of Representatives). 
188 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 27, 28, at 305–07 
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1690). In discussing the extent of legislative 
power, Locke emphasized that the power to tax derives from the consent of the people, given by a 
majority of the people or their representatives. Id. §§ 140–42, at 380–81. 
189 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174–82 (1974) (adopting a theory 
of property rights under which a person has an entitlement to property if acquired in accordance 
with “justice in acquisition” or with “justice in transfer” from someone else who was entitled to it). 
190 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 76–95. 
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illustrate the stark differences in assumptions between those who accept the idea of 
tax expenditures and those who reject it, most of the theoretical controversy about 
the tax expenditure concept among tax experts has focused on the difficulty of 
defining the “normal” tax base. 
The reconsideration of tax baseline issues by the Bush Administration is related 
to the policy question of whether the income tax should be replaced by a tax on 
consumption,191 and to the technical issue of how the baseline should be defined 
under our current system: a hybrid of income and consumption tax features.192 
Instead of focusing on the government’s power to tax, these questions raise issues 
about what should be taxed and on the relative values one might place on neutrality 
and equity norms. 
In theory, the tax base choice between an income or consumption tax is largely a 
question of how savings or changes in wealth should be treated by the tax system.193 
This question has been debated by economists and political theorists for over a 
century,194 and has received renewed political and scholarly attention in the United 
States during the last few decades.195
 
191 BUDGET, FY 2003, supra note 140, at 96–97. 
192 E.g., Michael S. Knoll, Designing a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
1791, 1798–1810 (1994) (summarizing the features of a consumption tax and an income tax); 
Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
1145, 1147, 1174–75 (1992) (arguing that a hybrid may be an appropriate policy goal); see Glenn, 
supra note 139 (quoting Treasury official on the nature of the reconsideration). 
193 This is related to the argument, traced back to Hobbes, that wealth is not appropriated for 
private purposes until withdrawn for personal use from the “common pool” of national savings. See 
NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 87–91 (1955); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the 
Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 962 (1992). As explained by Hobbes: 
[T]he equality of imposition, consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed than 
of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there that he which 
laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged 
than he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets, seeing the one hath no more 
protection from the commonwealth than the other? But when the impositions are laid upon 
those things which men consume, every man payeth equally for what he useth, nor is the 
commonwealth defrauded by the luxurious waste of private men. 
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 228 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett 1994) (1651). 
194 HOBBES, supra note 193; see also, e.g., RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
21–25 (rev. ed. 1976). 
195 E.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax Reform, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 
157–75 (1997) (describing different approaches to tax reform, including improving the existing tax 
base, modifying the tax base by adopting a consumption tax such as the Flat tax or the USA tax, 
and rationalizing the relationship between taxes); see, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1140–50 (1974); Michael J. 
Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1578–80 (1979); 
see also ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 40 (2d ed. 1995); U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS]. 
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Economic income has been defined as the market value of rights exercised in 
personal consumption plus the net change in wealth during the taxable period.196 An 
income tax imposes a “double” tax on savings or investment: once when the 
investment asset is purchased with the taxpayer’s after-tax earnings and again when 
the investment incrementally increases in value or generates additional earnings.197 
The income tax code frequently departs from this ideal of taxing “accretions” to 
wealth because of pragmatic considerations, as exemplified by its general failure to 
tax the unrealized appreciation of property198 and the imputed income from property 
or services.199
A consumption tax, on the other hand, taxes personal consumption and exempts 
net savings from the tax base. Personal consumption taxes can be implemented in the 
form of general retail sales taxes, value added taxes, or taxes on luxury purchases. As 
tax scholars have pointed out, they also can be implemented within the overall 
structure of a personal “income” tax in two different ways: 1) by allowing a 
deduction for savings and by including dissavings in the tax base, called the “cash 
flow” or “qualified account” method;200 or 2) by taxing income as it is earned but 
exempting from tax the return of invested capital and the yield on investments, called 
the “tax prepaid” or “yield exemption” method.201
 
196 See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing the Haig-Simons definition of 
income). 
197 As John Stuart Mill observed, income that is earned and consumed is subject to a single 
level of tax, and income that is earned and invested is subject to two levels of tax. JOHN STUART 
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 550–57 (J. Laurence Laughlin ed., 1884). 
In 2002, Pamela F. Olson, the then incoming Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax 
Policy, focused in part on the double tax on savings when asked at her Senate Finance Committee 
nomination hearing what priorities ought to be followed for tax reform: 
Well, I think that radical simplification may be the first step. But I do think that we need 
to look at some of the issues related to our double taxation of savings, because we have too 
many disincentives built into the system right now with respect to the taxation of savings. So, 
I think it is important for us to bear that in mind as we look at reform for the future. 
Unofficial Transcript of Finance Committee Hearing on Olson Nomination (Aug. 1, 2002), TAX 
NOTES TODAY 154-27, Aug. 9, 2002, LEXIS 2002 TNT 154-27. 
198 I.R.C. § 1001(a), (b) (2003) (defining gain from the sale or other disposition of property as 
the amount realized over the adjusted basis of the property). But see I.R.C. § 1296 (2003) (election 
of mark-to-market for marketable stock); I.R.C. § 1256 (2003) (mark-to-market requirements for 
certain futures contracts and options). 
199 Imputed income includes the market value of services a taxpayer performs for himself. 
See SIMONS, supra note 170, at 52. It also includes the annual rental value of property owned by 
the taxpayer, such as the house she lives in or the car she drives during the year. See BLUEPRINTS, 
supra note 195, at 7, 89. 
200 See Andrews, supra note 195, at 1116; BLUEPRINTS, supra note 195, at 113–14. 
201 See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 195, at 115 (using the two different methods as design 
features in a model consumption tax); Graetz, supra note 195, at 1586 (arguing for caution in 
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Our current income tax system has been described as a hybrid of income and 
consumption design features.202 With regard to savings, the hybrid nature of the 
current system can be illustrated by the treatment of personal savings in regular 
interest-bearing bank accounts as compared with the special tax treatment accorded 
certain types of retirement savings. The treatment of a personal savings account 
comports with the model income tax “double” tax on savings: the nondeductible 
deposits are made with after-tax dollars and the interest earned on the account is 
taxable.203 By contrast, the special tax treatment of individual retirement accounts 
and qualified pension plans comports with a consumption tax model.204
For example, certain Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and qualified 
pension plans allow a deduction for qualified retirement contributions, permit tax-
free buildup of investment earnings, and impose tax on the distributions made after 
retirement (or dissavings).205 This pattern comports with the treatment of savings 
under a “cash flow” or “qualified account” method of taxing consumption. 
Roth IRAs,206 on the other hand, follow the “tax prepaid” or “yield exemption” 
consumption tax method. Contributions to the account are made with after-tax 
dollars207 and the investment returns and distributions are tax-free.208
Because these provisions depart from the “normal” income tax treatment of 
savings (no deduction for contributions and tax on earnings), they are currently listed 
as “tax expenditures.”209 As tax-favored forms of savings, they provide incentives 
for individuals to save for their retirement years during their working years. 
E. Example: Public Debate Regarding Savings and Investment 
 
treating the two methods as equivalent due to the number of unrealistic assumptions that must be 
met for the equivalence to hold); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash 
Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 938 (1975). The equivalence was first stated by 
E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT 
AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 301 (1948). 
202 See, e.g., William D. Andrews & David F. Bradford, Savings Incentives in a Hybrid 
Income Tax, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 269, 
270 n.4 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988). 
203 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2003). 
204 See Jonathan Barry Forman, The Tax Treatment of Public and Private Pension Plans 
Around the World, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 299, 305–11 (1997). 
205 See I.R.C. §§ 219, 401, 402, 501 (2003). For qualified pension plans, the employer is 
permitted a deduction for the contribution to the plan and the contribution is excluded from the 
employee’s income. See I.R.C. § 404 (2003). 
206 See I.R.C. § 408A (2003). 
207 See I.R.C. § 408A(c) (2003) (allowing no deduction for contributions). 
208 See I.R.C. § 408A(d) (2003) (excluding qualified distributions from gross income). 
209 See J. COMM. TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2002–2006, supra note 132, at 26, 
27 (listing under income security, net exclusion of pension contributions and earnings, and 
separately tabulated for employer plans, individual retirement plans, Keogh plans, etc.). 
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The use of a “normal” income tax as the tax baseline for purposes of the tax 
expenditure budget means that the consumption-based savings features in the code 
will be identified as “tax expenditures.” If the Administration’s policy goal is to 
move toward a consumption-based tax system,210 either incrementally or through 
more comprehensive tax reform,211 the revenue losses identified in adopting features 
inconsistent with an income tax create budgetary and political obstacles to achieving 
such a goal. Hence, adoption of either 1) a modified “hybrid” reference tax 
baseline212 based on current hybrid features of the code,213 or 2) a consumption tax 
baseline could make such a transformation somewhat easier to achieve. The 
associated revenue losses could entirely disappear under either alternative baseline. 
The Bush Administration took an incremental approach to tax reform by 
proposing expansion of various types of tax-favored private retirement savings,214 
education savings accounts,215 and health savings accounts.216 These types of 
provisions expand tax-favored savings beyond a primary focus on retirement savings 
to include private savings for other purposes. Removing a level of tax on a broader 
set of savings accounts moves the tax system closer toward a consumption base tax 
system. Over time, that shift could have an impact on the level of retirement savings 
 
210 The shift to a consumption-based tax system has been linked to certain privatization goals. 
See Lester B. Snyder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the Federal Income Tax: 
Taking the Tax Law “Private” Through the Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes, 13 AM. J. 
TAX POL’Y 1, 18–23, 33, 85 (1996) (suggesting that consumption tax proposals should be viewed 
as an attempt to reduce the size of government by lowering tax burdens on capital and by reducing 
tax revenues). 
211 The various consumption tax proposals (flat tax, USA tax, etc.) proposed during the 1990s 
as replacements for the income tax code did not attract sufficient political support for enactment by 
Congress. See Warren, supra note 195, at 174–75. 
212 See supra note 139 and text accompanying notes 174 and 202. 
213 Although comments by Treasury officials after the submission of the first Bush budget 
appeared to suggest that such a baseline might be considered as an option, the second budget did 
not list a hybrid baseline as an option, but instead pointed to the development of two separate 
baselines: one based on comprehensive income and one based on consumption. See supra note 139 
and text accompanying notes 140–43. 
214 See Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 
38 (creating a new nonrefundable tax credit for up to $2,000 of elective contributions to qualified 
pension plans and IRAs for taxable years 2002–2006, increasing contribution limits and catch-up 
contributions for IRAs, increasing contribution and benefit limits for qualified plans, and providing 
a tax credit for certain administrative expenses for new pension plans adopted by small businesses). 
215 See id. (increasing the annual limit on contributions to Coverdell education savings 
accounts from $500 to $2,000); I.R.C. § 530 (2003). 
216 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET PROPOSAL 53–57 (J. 
Comm. Print 2002); see also I.R.C. §§ 220, 223 (2003) (health savings accounts added for taxable 
years beginning after 2003 by Title XII of the Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003)). 
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for lower and moderate income taxpayers by altering the existing incentives.217 
Furthermore, expanded private retirement provisions, combined with 
recharacterization of their revenue cost for purposes of the tax expenditure budget, 
may make it politically more feasible to reform social security along lines favored by 
the Bush Administration.218
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVELY FINANCED PERFORMANCE 
Tax incentives are subject to less monitoring on an ongoing basis than other 
types of discretionary spending by the government. Tax provisions are not subject to 
the appropriations process and, thus, generally are not subject to spending caps or to 
annual appropriations from Congress.219 Unless enacted with a sunset provision, tax 
incentives become a potentially permanent part of the tax code, remaining in effect 
until amended or repealed.220 Tax incentives typically are not subject to the types of 
 
217 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY 265 (1999) 
(observing that “[t]he effectiveness of incentives for employer-sponsored pensions also depends 
significantly on the presence or absence of other tax-preferred alternatives” and that “vulnerability 
to unrelated tax policy shifts” has been suggested as a reason for mandatory employment-related 
pension plans or mandatory contributions to individual retirement accounts); Daniel I. Halperin, 
Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is It “Still” Viable as a Means 
of Increasing Retirement Income? Should It Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1, 46–50 (1993) 
(discussing the impact of income tax incentives and other factors on retirement savings). 
218 President George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
109, 110 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/ (proposing 
offering “younger workers a chance to invest in retirement accounts that they will control and that 
they will own”); see also Specifics on the The President’s Plan to Strengthen Social Security, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security/ (Feb. 28, 2002) (including tax provisions 
aimed at expanding ownership of retirement assets). 
219 As explained by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, tax expenditures “are 
similar to those direct spending programs that are available as entitlements to those who meet the 
statutory criteria established for the programs.” J. COMM. TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 
2004–2008, supra note 132, at 2; see also STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., 
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2001–2005, at 2 n.5 (J. Comm. 
Print 2001) (noting that a few tax expenditures have statutory limits and giving the example of the 
tax credit for low-income rental housing, which is available only to those who have received 
statutorily limited credit allocations from State housing authorities). See generally Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 379, 400–09 (1998) (describing the varied and overlapping nature of tax and direct spending 
programs; comparing them to each other by reference to factors including permanence, eligibility, 
and quantity, that is, whether the expenditures are capped like appropriations or uncapped like 
entitlement programs). 
220 Sunset provisions automatically terminate unless they are extended by Congress. The 
periodic extension of a set of “expiring” tax provisions has become an established feature of the tax 
legislative process. See, e.g., The Tax Relief Extension Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, §§ 500–
512, 113 Stat. 1861, 1918–25 (extending many expiring tax provisions through December 31, 
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alternative forms of monitoring possible in negotiated relationships, such as in 
governmental contracting.221
The tax-writing committees provide oversight of Internal Revenue Service 
implementation of hundreds of programs provided through the tax code, covering 
many program areas, from agriculture to welfare-related provisions. However, tax-
delivered subsidies largely escape performance management requirements currently 
imposed by Congress on other federal agency programs.222
The discussion below is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the 
expiration of certain budgetary monitoring mechanisms applied to tax incentives and 
describes the need for a new consensus. The second section discusses the need for 
performance monitoring of tax incentives. The use of tax incentives without 
accountability for results is inconsistent with the Administration’s rhetoric of 
governmental reform, which has emphasized citizen-centered, results-oriented, 
market-based reforms.223
 
2001). An across-the-board sunset provision was enacted as part of the Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. The Act expires after 2010, unless Congress extends it. Pub. L. 
No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150 (2001). 
221 See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 7, at 550–51 (discussing negotiated relationships). 
222 See Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program Oversight 
Under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751, 817–25 
(2000) (arguing that tax expenditures should be subject to the performance management 
requirements applied to discretionary expenditures). 
223 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: CREATING A BETTER GOVERNMENT: IMPROVING GOVERNMENT 
PERFORMANCE: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 11–14 (2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/budget.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET, CREATING A 
BETTER GOVERNMENT: FY 2002] (listing priorities for those reforms). The FY 2003 Budget 
expanded on those priorities by setting forth five areas for improved management performance. 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT: GOVERNING WITH ACCOUNTABILITY: OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2003, at  
43–54 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/bud09.pdf 
(including strategic management of human capital, competitive sourcing, improved financial 
performance, expanded e-government, and budget and performance integration). A color-coded 
scorecard kept score on agency progress towards those goals. Id. at 48–50; see also THE 
PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA, supra note 21, at 3–30. 
The FY 2004 Budget presented a new Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), with a 
stated goal of rating one-fifth of all federal programs each year, on four areas of assessment: 
“purpose and design, strategic planning, management, and results and accountability”, with 
“overall qualitative ratings that range from Effective, to Moderately Effective, to Adequate, to 
Ineffective.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: RATING THE PERFORMANCE OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS: FISCAL YEAR 
2004, at 47–53 (2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/budget/performance.pdf. As reported in the 
FY 2005 Budget, about forty percent of federal programs (including both mandatory and 
discretionary programs) have been initially assessed under PART. See BUDGET, FY 2005, supra 
2004] FINANCING OF PRIVATE CHOICE 899 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                  
A. Collective Financing: The Budget Process 
Budget process restrictions, adopted in 1990224 and now expired, are under 
review by the Administration and by Congress.225 The budgetary surpluses reported 
in the last part of the 1990s eliminated much of the deficit-related consensus that led 
to the adoption of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA).226 Although the 
BEA requirements were nominally in effect through fiscal year 2002 for most 
categories of spending,227 the rules had less impact as deficits declined.228 Congress 
largely ignored them in enacting the major tax cut in 2001.229 The following 
 
note 144, at 9, 12 (about forty percent of programs evaluated were found to be effective or 
moderately effective, twenty-five percent were found to be adequate or ineffective, and forty 
percent were unable to demonstrate results). With regard to the Treasury Department, the only tax-
related program listed as evaluated under PART is the earned income credit program, a refundable 
credit requiring direct federal outlays, which received a rating of “ineffective.” Id. at 19. 
224 Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 [hereinafter BEA] (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
225 BUDGET, FY 2003, supra note 140, at 283. 
226 Testimony of Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management and Budget, Before 
the House Budget Committee on the Budget Enforcement Act, TAX NOTES TODAY 125-32, June 27, 
2001, LEXIS 2001 TNT 125-32 [hereinafter OMB Director’s House Budget Committee 
Testimony] (stating that “the Administration believes that the BEA should be modernized in order 
to guide budget decisions in an era of surplus”). 
227 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 10201–205, 111 Stat. 251, 
697–702 (extending discretionary spending limits and PAYGO requirements until October 1, 
2002); Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, §§ 8101–03, 112 Stat. 
107, 488–92 (1998) (extending limits to 2003 for expenditures for highways and mass transit); 
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-291, 
114 Stat. 922 (adding a new category for conservation spending with limits on budget authority and 
outlays for 2002–2006, with limits on discretionary spending until 2006). According to recent 
budget documents, “[b]ecause the BEA itself expired after 2002, the categories in later years will 
apply to budgets for those years only if an extension of the BEA is enacted and those categories are 
retained.” BUDGET, FY 2004, supra note 59, at 460. 
228 See BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 243 (stating that “Congress and the previous 
Administration began to skirt the budget enforcement mechanisms” after the reporting of budget 
surpluses in 1998). “In 2001 alone, appropriations exceeded the discretionary spending levels set in 
the BEA, requiring a $95.5 billion increase in the cap for that year to accommodate the increase. In 
2001, PAYGO requirements for $17 billion in spending were also waived.” Id. See also BUDGET, 
FY 2003, supra note 140, at 291 (explaining that the PAYGO process requires OMB to maintain a 
“scorecard” that shows the cumulative net cost impact of PAYGO legislation, and that for 2002, 
net costs of $130.3 billion were removed from the PAYGO scorecard, thus skirting PAYGO 
constraints). 
229 See Rojas, supra note 181 (reporting that Dan L. Crippen, director of the Congressional 
Budget Office, told House Budget Committee members that the $1.35 trillion tax cut had already 
been added to the PAYGO scorecard and would likely be waived because of the surplus). For a 
description of the mechanisms used by Congress to bypass BEA requirements in legislation 
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subsections discuss the BEA rules, the Administration’s publicly stated position with 
regard to BEA-type procedures, and the need for a new consensus in Congress to 
replace them. 
1. BEA and the Budget Process 
Under the BEA,230 budget tradeoffs were made within the two separate 
packages of 1) discretionary spending programs and 2) tax and entitlement 
programs.231 The BEA’s limitations on these two parts of the budget are discussed in 
greater detail below, beginning with discretionary spending limits, followed by an 
explanation of the procedures applied to tax and entitlement programs. Across-the-
board reductions of non-exempt spending, known as “sequestration,” enforced 
compliance with the BEA’s requirements.232
The BEA limited discretionary spending through spending caps and certain 
statutory enforcement procedures.233 The spending caps provided a form of budget 
discipline within the overall budget process. The congressional budget committees 
drafted budget resolutions, which established a total amount that could be expended 
for discretionary programs during the year.234 House and Senate appropriations 
committees allocated those totals among their subcommittees. Under the spending 
caps, new discretionary programs competed for funds with all discretionary 
programs within certain broad categories and then with all the existing programs 
within the purview of the relevant appropriations subcommittee.235
The budget process kept score of spending and provided for various procedural 
 
enacted after 2000, see Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax 
Legislative Process, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 919–20 (2002) (including classifying legislation as 
“emergency” legislation, and thus effectively removing it from the PAYGO scorecard, and 
directing the Office of Management and Budget to set the scorecard back to zero). 
230 See supra note 224. 
231 See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget 
Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 397–405 (1998) [hereinafter Garrett, Rethinking] (describing 
the two-part division of the budget into discretionary programs, containing subdivisions 
corresponding to the jurisdiction of the thirteen appropriations subcommittees, and tax and 
entitlement legislation, falling within the jurisdiction of the tax-writing committees). 
232 See BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 243. 
233 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 645, 901 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
234 The budget resolution is a concurrent resolution, which is not signed by the President and 
is not law. Its spending limits for discretionary programs could differ from the caps set by the BEA. 
The budget resolution is enforced through parliamentary points of order. See Elizabeth Garrett, The 
Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 
715–17 (2000) [hereinafter Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process] (describing the budget 
committees and the budget resolution, the reconciliation process, and budget summits as centralized 
decision-making procedures). 
235 See Garrett, Rethinking, supra note 231, at 399. 
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mechanisms to enforce the spending caps set by the budget resolution. Under the 
BEA, if appropriations exceeded the statutory spending caps, a sequestration 
“reduce[d] spending for most programs in the category by a uniform percentage,”236 
eliminating the excess in programs that are funded in the spending category in which 
the overage occurred. 
The BEA controlled new tax and entitlement legislation237 through restrictions 
known as “pay-as-you-go” or “PAYGO” requirements.238 The BEA did “not cap 
mandatory spending239 or require a certain level of receipts,”240 but instead adopted 
a PAYGO principle of “revenue neutrality” for new legislation. 
The congressional budget resolution set the amount of revenue to be raised by 
taxes during the year, provided for the debt limit, and, as noted above, set 
discretionary spending limits. The tax-writing committees proposed a mix of tax 
rates and other tax changes that would meet revenue targets specified in the budget 
resolution.241 After the expiration of the BEA, PAYGO restrictions continued to 
apply on a limited basis through internal congressional budget procedures.242
Under the BEA’s PAYGO provisions, tax changes resulting in revenue loss had 
to be paid for by tax increases or by offsetting revenue gains from modifications to 
existing tax provisions or in cuts to the entitlement programs under the jurisdiction of 
the tax-writing committees.243 However, they could not be offset by cuts in 
 
236 See BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 443. However, the BEA “specifies special rules 
for reducing some programs and exempts some programs from sequestration entirely.” Id. 
237 PAYGO did not apply to increased mandatory spending (which includes entitlement 
spending) or decreases in tax receipts that are not the result of new laws. Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Mandatory spending, sometimes called “direct spending,” refers to spending that is not 
controlled through appropriations. It includes the largest entitlement programs, such as social 
security and Medicare, as well as means-tested entitlement programs (including Medicaid, food 
stamps, and other programs for low-income families and individuals), and other mandatory 
spending (including interest payments and federal retirement and insurance programs). Entitlement 
spending is largely determined by eligibility and benefits formulas. 
240 BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 443. 
241 See Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process, supra note 234, at 715–17. 
242 E.g., Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, TAX NOTES TODAY 72-
17, § 505, April 11, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 72-17 (adopting a PAYGO point of order in the 
Senate). The rule may be waived by a supermajority vote of sixty Senators. Id. See Block, supra 
note 229, at 884–85 (describing the Senate’s internal PAYGO mechanisms adopted as point-of-
order rules incorporated into yearly budget resolutions); see, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, A Fiscal 
Constitution With Supermajority Voting Rules, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 471, 479–80 (1999). 
243 See Block, supra note 229, at 884–85. See generally COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 106TH CONG., 2D SESS., 2000 GREENBOOK: BACKGROUND 
MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND 
MEANS vii (Comm. Print 2000) (including jurisdiction over tax provisions as well as major 
entitlement programs, including social security, Medicare, and numerous other programs providing 
social welfare benefits). 
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discretionary spending programs. PAYGO was enforced by its own independent 
sequestration and enforcement provisions.244
Although the BEA slowed the growth of new federal spending during a period 
of substantial federal deficits,245 and thus played an important budgetary control 
role, the BEA increased the separation between tax expenditures and discretionary 
programs for purposes of policy analysis. It created incentives to channel new 
spending through the “tax side” of the budget,246 and resulted in greater tax code 
complexity.247 However, at the same time, PAYGO arguably increased the 
transparency of the tax legislative process.248
2. The Need for a New Consensus 
 
244 See 2 U.S.C. § 902 (1994). The procedures were as follows: 
The BEA sequestration procedures require a uniform reduction of mandatory spending 
programs that are neither exempt nor subject to special rules. The BEA exempts social 
security, interest on the public debt, Federal employee retirement, Medicaid, most means-
tested entitlements, deposit insurance, other prior legal obligations, and most unemployment 
benefits. A special rule limits the sequestration of Medicare spending to no more than four 
percent, and special rules for some other programs limit the size of a sequestration for those 
programs. As a result of exemptions and special rules, only about three percent of all 
mandatory spending is subject to sequestration, including the maximum amounts allowed 
under special rules. 
BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 443. 
245 Bud Newman, U.S. Budget: Pay-As-You-Go Rules Are Irrelevant, Ways and Means 
Staffer Tells ABA, 94 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) G-3 (May 15, 2000) at 
http://pubs.ban.com/ip/BNA/DTR.NSF (reporting observations by congressional staff that the 
budget surplus eliminated the congressional consensus that kept PAYGO on the books, that the 
discretionary spending caps had more influence than PAYGO, and that the latest budget restriction 
to have an impact on potential tax code changes was the understanding that neither tax cuts nor 
entitlement spending could result in the use of the social security surplus). 
246 See Burman, supra note 183, at 409. Unlike the offsets available to discretionary spending 
proponents, the potential offsets available to proponents of new tax expenditures were not limited 
to a subset of programs related by subject matter within the jurisdiction of the appropriations 
subcommittees. Instead they included all those tax and entitlement measures under the jurisdiction 
of the tax-writing committees. Garrett, Rethinking, supra note 231, at 401. It is possible, however, 
that discretionary funding advocates might have been able to target unrelated offset options earlier 
in the budget committee allocation process. See Roin, supra note 135, at 629. 
247 See, e.g., Charles E. McClure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax 
Simplification/Complication, 45 TAX L. REV. 25, 28–30 (1989) (describing the interaction between 
budget policy and tax policy); see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE 
INCOME TAX 186–88 (1997) (describing, in general, the adverse effects of budget politics on tax 
legislation in the decade following 1986). 
248 See Garrett, Offset Requirements, supra note 165, at 504 (arguing that budget rules 
provide a mechanism to harness interest group conflict, giving lawmakers an opportunity to review 
and modify tax subsidies and encouraging them “to provide reasons for their decisions, thus 
increasing their accountability to the electorate”). 
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Any revival of the BEA, to be effective, must represent a consensus in Congress 
about both the need for budget discipline and the rules for constraint. No such 
consensus has emerged since the BEA’s expiration in 2002, although growing 
deficits may prompt reconsideration. 
The Bush Administration’s first budget submission proposed the extension and 
modification of BEA requirements by raising the discretionary spending caps and 
extending them through 2005.249 In addition, the Administration proposed extending 
and setting new PAYGO requirements for entitlement spending and tax 
legislation:250
This Administration proposes to extend the PAYGO requirements. The President’s 
budget sets aside the Social Security surplus and additional on-budget surpluses for 
debt reduction and contingencies. These levels ensure the President’s tax plan and 
his Medicare Helping Hand and modernization reforms are fully financed by the 
surplus. The Administration will work with Congress to set new PAYGO 
requirements that accommodate these proposals.251
The Administration’s proposal thus apparently proposed a minimum threshold 
of protecting the Social Security Trust Fund Surplus,252 suggesting a consensus 
point used by Congress in the past when PAYGO restrictions were skirted.253 The 
Director of the OMB later suggested the following mechanism to implement BEA 
restrictions: 
Once this minimum threshold is set, new discretionary spending “caps” and 
“paygo” requirements could be determined on an annual basis through the vehicle 
of a Joint Budget Resolution. In fact, if one considers the various changes to the 
BEA since 1990, it could be argued that the Executive Branch and the Legislative 
Branch have, from time to time, entered into agreements that amounted to de facto 
joint budget resolutions. I refer here to the Executive-Legislative Summit 
agreements of 1990, 1993, and 1997. We should consider regularizing this step as 
an annual process.254
If PAYGO were extended and modified along the lines first suggested by the 
Administration, it would provide a continuing examination of tax incentives from a 
budgetary perspective. However, the effectiveness of any BEA extension would also 
depend upon Congress’s honoring of the spirit of the agreement over a period of 
years. 
 
249 BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 243. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 443. 
252 See OMB Director’s House Budget Committee Testimony, supra note 226. 
253 See Newman, supra note 245. 
254 OMB Director’s House Budget Committee Testimony, supra note 226. 
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The Bush Administration’s second budget, submitted during a “War on 
Terrorism” and an economic “slowdown that was worsened by the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001,” observed that “budget surpluses for the short term have 
disappeared; and the general purpose discretionary caps and PAYGO requirements 
of BEA no longer apply.”255 The Administration pledged to work with Congress 
during the next session to develop enforcement mechanisms, including future 
discretionary spending limits and PAYGO requirements for entitlement spending 
and tax legislation “that are consistent with the needs of the country.”256
In addition, the Administration proposed a joint budget resolution to set overall 
levels of spending, receipts, and debt. The joint resolution, which would require the 
President’s signature, would have the force of law and “be enforced by sequesters 
requiring automatic across-the-board cuts by category to offset any excess spending, 
similar to the BEA.”257 This mechanism would require the President and Congress 
to agree “on overall fiscal policy before individual tax and spending bills are 
enacted, and avoid the ‘train wrecks’ at the end of the year that frequently occurs 
under the current process.”258 Alternatively, the budget submission suggested that 
enforcement could involve extension of the BEA. If so, the Administration “would 
support discretionary caps that are consistent with the discretionary levels proposed 
in the 2003 budget and PAYGO requirements that would carry out the 2003 
budget’s proposals for mandatory spending and receipts.”259 The Administration’s 
third budget renewed its pledge to support renewal of discretionary caps and 
PAYGO, with discretionary caps and PAYGO requirements to be proposed at levels 
sufficient to support its budget proposals.260
Significantly, the budget submitted in the last year of Bush’s four-year term 
outlined a new position on revenue provisions. The Administration’s budget 
submission supported renewal of discretionary spending caps, consistent with its 
level of fiscal year 2005 budget proposals, and reimposition of PAYGO for 
mandatory spending only (including entitlement programs such as Social 
Security).261 Accordingly, if the Administration’s position were adopted by 
Congress, PAYGO would not be applied to tax legislation. The budget submission 
also reiterated its support of a joint budget resolution with the force of law, 
permitting the President to be engaged earlier in the budget process.262 In addition, it 
advocated enactment of a “constitutional” line item veto.263 As of this writing, the 
 
255 BUDGET, FY 2003, supra note 140, at 283. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 283–84. 
259 Id. at 284. 
260 BUDGET, FY 2004, supra note 59, at 315–16. 
261 BUDGET, FY 2005, supra note 144, at 215–16. 
262 Id. at 218. 
263 Id. at 218–19. 
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BEA had not been extended and Congress had reached an impasse on PAYGO.264
3. Relationship to Privatization 
A reconceptualization of the tax expenditure concept could alter the types of tax 
provisions viewed as “revenue-losing” provisions. Most significantly, if a 
consumption tax baseline were used for purposes of defining tax expenditures, tax 
provisions favoring retirement savings would not be listed as revenue losers. This 
would place the political debate about individual retirement accounts or education 
savings accounts in a less transparent political environment by obscuring the political 
tradeoffs. 
If BEA-style PAYGO and discretionary caps were revived, tax and entitlement 
offsets could once again become a feature of the tax legislative process. If 
discretionary spending caps return and PAYGO is fully revived, the pressure to 
channel spending to the tax side of the budget could continue, depending upon the 
restrictiveness of the caps adopted. The policy separation between the two budget 
packages of discretionary spending and tax and entitlement programs would 
continue unabated, unless the budget resolution incorporates a more structured 
oversight mechanism to permit coordinated review of tax expenditures as well as 
discretionary spending programs. 
As indicated in its fiscal year 2005 budget submission, however, the 
Administration rejected PAYGO as applied to tax legislation.265 In the past, the 
Administration had supported such an extension of BEA, at least in principle if not 
in practice.266 Exempting tax legislation from PAYGO while imposing budget 
process restrictions on discretionary and mandatory spending would shift even more 
spending to the tax side of the budget. 
B. Private Performance: Accountability Gaps 
New challenges in achieving accountability accompany the shift in public 
management267 from Progressive-era and New Deal-type centrally managed federal 
 
264 Because of the impasse on PAYGO, the Republican controlled House and Senate have 
not yet completed action on the 2005 fiscal year budget resolution. Four Senate Republicans joined 
the Senate Democrats to back PAYGO, and refused to support any final budget plan that failed to 
contain a multi-year PAYGO provision for tax cuts. Republican negotiators then agreed on a one-
year budget, setting the 2005 fiscal year discretionary spending cap at $821 billion. Although the 
budget resolution conference report passed narrowly in the House, it did not pass in the Senate, 
where the four Republicans joined the Democrats to block its passage. See Bud Newman, Senate 
Democrats Unsure Whether to Fight Unprecedented GOP Move to Adjust Budget, 139 DAILY TAX 
REP. (BNA) G-8  (July 21, 2004). 
265 See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra notes 249–60 and accompanying text. 
267 See generally Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 160–64, 
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programs and command-and-control regulatory models to decentralized and market-
based models. In this decentralized environment, a management system based on 
results makes more sense, some argue, than one based on hierarchical process or 
input controls on the management of equipment, staff, and budgets.268 The federal 
government has been developing a management framework designed to assess the 
performance of traditional federal programs or services provided by government 
agencies as well as for programs or financial assistance provided through various 
alternative, more private or decentralized mechanisms. This framework could 
provide a useful model for evaluating the effectiveness of tax incentives. So far the 
model has been applied to traditional governmental programs but not to tax-
delivered programs. 
1. Performance Management Requirements 
Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA),269 
Congress requires federal agencies to set goals for program performance, to measure 
performance results, and to report the results on an annual basis to the President and 
Congress.270 The agencies must develop multi-year strategic plans for their program 
activities,271 establish measurable performance goals,272 develop annual plans to 
 
201–07 (2000) (describing the shift from hierarchical structures, providing specific examples of the 
contracting out of governmental services, and discussing the challenges posed to administrative law 
by the shift). 
268 E.g., DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 139 (1992). 
269 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 
[hereinafter GPRA] (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 39 U.S.C.). 
270 In enacting the GPRA, Congress found that “[f]ederal managers are seriously 
disadvantaged” in efforts “to improve program efficiency and effectiveness, because of insufficient 
articulation of program goals and inadequate information on program performance” and that 
“congressional policymaking, spending decisions and program oversight are seriously handicapped 
by insufficient attention to program performance and results.” Id. § 2(a)(2)–(3). The purposes of the 
GPRA, among others, are to “improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by 
promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction” and to “improve 
congressional decisionmaking by providing more objective information on achieving statutory 
objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending . . . .” 
Id. § 2(b)(3), (5). 
271 5 U.S.C. § 306(b) (2000). 
272 The performance plans must “establish performance indicators to be used in measuring or 
assessing the relevant outputs, service levels, and outcomes of each program activity . . . .” 31 
U.S.C. § 1115(a)(4) (2000). An “output measure” is more specifically defined by the GPRA as “the 
tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort and can be expressed in a quantitative or 
qualitative manner . . . .” Id. § 1115(g)(3). An “outcome measure” is defined as “an assessment of 
the results of a program activity compared to its intended purpose . . . .” Id. § 1115(g)(2). 
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help them meet their performance goals,273 and prepare annual reports on their 
progress toward meeting their goals.274
The GPRA, which grew out of regulatory initiatives begun during the Reagan 
Administration, was first introduced during the Administration of President George 
Herbert Walker Bush and enacted into law during the Clinton Administration.275 
The GPRA initially created pilot programs to assess the costs and benefits of the 
performance requirement and to test the specifications for performance plans. 
Congress required the OMB to report the results of the performance management 
pilot studies to the President and Congress by May 1, 1997,276 and since then, the 
requirements have been more broadly implemented.277
The Agency’s performance plans and reports cover each of their program 
activities listed in the annual budget.278 The term “program activity” is defined as “a 
specific activity or project as listed in the program and financing schedules of the 
annual budget of the United States Government.”279 The program and financing 
schedules, designed primarily for use by the Appropriations Committees, are 
arranged according to each separate branch of government, with the executive 
branch organized by agency.280 Tax-delivered programs are not listed in the 
Treasury Department’s program and financing schedule unless they involve direct 
outlays (such as refundable tax credits). 
The GPRA also requires the president’s annual budget submission to include a 
government-wide performance plan.281 Although the statute does not specify that 
 
273 Id. §§ 1105(a)(28), 1115(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
274 Id. § 1115(a)(4)–(6). 
275 See Walter Groszyk, Implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993, in OECD, PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT: CONTEMPORARY ILLUSTRATIONS 
71, 74 (1996) (listing as immediate antecedents of the GPRA, a Reagan administration OMB 
report, legislation proposed by Senator Roth (R., Del.) based on state and local experiences over the 
previous decade, and program performance measures and information required under the Chief 
Financial Officers Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-576, 104 Stat. 2838 (codified beginning at 31 
U.S.C. § 501)); see also William V. Roth, Jr., Reinventing Government: Maintaining the 
Momentum, PUB. MANAGER, Winter 1993–94, at 15, 15–17 (describing bipartisan reform efforts). 
276 31 U.S.C. §§ 1118(c) (2000). 
277 See id. §§ 1105(a)(28), 1115(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004); id. § 1116(a) (2000). 
278 Id. § 1115(a), (g)(6). 
279 Id. § 1115(g)(6). 
280 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: APPENDIX: DETAILED BUDGET ESTIMATES: FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 4 
(2000) (detailing the information provided by the “program and financing schedule,” including 
“obligations by program activity” and explaining that “[t]he activity structure is developed for each 
appropriation or fund account to provide a meaningful presentation of information for the 
program”). 
281 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(28) (2000) (requiring that the president’s budget submission to 
Congress include a “performance plan for the overall budget as provided for under section 1115”). 
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analysis of tax expenditures be included in the government-wide performance 
plan,282 the legislative history of the GPRA requests that the government-wide 
performance plans contain a “schedule for periodically assessing the effects of . . . tax 
expenditures in achieving performance goals.”283 As specified by the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, the assessments “should consider the 
relationship and interactions between spending programs and related tax 
expenditures.” 284
In its 1997 GPRA report to Congress,285 the OMB set forth an initial framework 
for tax expenditure review, emphasizing that developing a “comprehensive, accurate, 
and flexible” framework “to reflect the objectives and effects of the wide range of 
tax expenditures will be a significant challenge.”286 OMB assigned Treasury lead 
responsibility for pilot evaluations of selected tax expenditures “[t]o explore methods 
for tax expenditure evaluation” and “to gather experience on a cross-section of 
issues.”287
Treasury’s initial pilot study selected three tax expenditures288 to study the 
evaluation methods and resource needs connected with evaluating the relationship 
between tax expenditures and performance goals. Treasury found that the 
information needed for analysis was not available.289 Assessment of data needs and 
availability from governmental and non-governmental sources, it concluded, should 
prove useful to compare the effectiveness of tax expenditures with “outlay, 
regulatory and other tax policies as means of achieving objectives.”290 It therefore 
 
Programs are listed in the performance plan under certain functional categories used in the budget 
(including national defense, agriculture, housing and commerce, education, training, employment 
and social services, and income security), according to the program’s major purpose. BUDGET, FY 
2002, supra note 135, at 445–46 (discussing functional classification). 
282 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(28) (2000). In past years, the government-wide performance plan has 
included tax expenditures in a listing of federal resources by function (national defense, energy, 
agriculture, commerce and housing, etc.). That pattern continued in the Bush Administration’s first 
budget submission. See BUDGET, CREATING A BETTER GOVERNMENT: FY 2002, supra  note 223, at 
15–18 tbl.1-1 (2001) (listing spending, credit activity, and tax expenditures by budget function). 
283 S. REP. NO. 103-58, at 28 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 327, 354. 
284 Id. 
285 See supra notes 276–77 and accompanying text (relating to statutory requirement). 
286 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE GOVERNMENT 
PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FROM THE DIRECTOR 
OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET IV (May 1997). 
287 Id. 
288 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 121 (1999) (listing the 
tax exemption for worker’s compensation benefits, the tax credit for non-conventional fuels, and 
the tax exclusion for certain amounts of income earned by Americans living abroad). 
289 Id. 
290 Id. 
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planned studies focusing on the availability of data needed to assess the effects of 
“selected significant tax expenditures, primarily those designed to increase 
savings.”291
As part of this effort, Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis and the IRS Statistics of 
Income Division developed “the specifications for a new data sample which will 
follow the same individual income tax filers over an extended period of time.”292 
The sample will attempt to capture the effect of changes in tax law over an extended 
period of time to “enhance our ability to analyze the effect of tax expenditures 
designed to increase savings.”293
The Bush Administration’s first budget submission reported that the 
specifications had been developed, and that the sample, beginning with tax returns 
filed in 2000 for the tax year 1999, will follow the same taxpayers “over a period of 
at least ten years.”294 In addition, it reported that “[o]ther efforts by OMB, Treasury, 
and other agencies to improve data available for the analysis of savings tax 
expenditures will continue over the next several years.”295 The second Bush 
Administration budget reported that the first year of the panel sample was drawn 
from tax returns filed for the tax year 1999, and that the “sample will capture the 
changing demographic and economic circumstances of individuals and the effects of 
changes in tax law over an extended period of time.”296 It remains to be seen how 
the Administration’s reconsideration of the tax expenditure concept will affect the 
data collection effort with regard to savings-related tax expenditures.297
Unlike the glacial pace of assessment of tax-delivered programs, the evaluation 
of mandatory and discretionary federal programs was proceeding on the relatively 
brisk schedule of about one-fifth of all mandatory and discretionary federal programs 
per year.298 The Bush Administration implemented its performance assessment of 
these collectively financed federal programs as part of its overall program of 
performance management review. Those assessments included no tax-delivered 
programs other than the earned income tax credit program, which as a refundable tax 
credit, involves direct federal outlays.299 The goal of the Administration’s 
 
291 Id. 
292 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 124 (2000). 
293 Id. 
294 BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 77. 
295 Id. at 78. 
296 BUDGET, FY 2003, supra note 140, at 113. 
297 The FY 2005 budget merely reports that the study of savings related tax expenditures is 
on-going. BUDGET, FY 2005, supra note 144, at 300–01 (reporting that efforts to improve data 
collection will continue). 
298 See supra note 223 (describing the Administration’s PART initiative). 
299 BUDGET, FY 2005, supra note 144, at 19. See supra note 223 (referencing PART 
assessment of the earned income credit). 
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performance and budget integration initiative was to have program assessment 
information routinely considered by Congress and the executive branch in making 
management and funding decisions.300
2. Relationship to Privatization 
The Bush Administration’s reconsideration of the tax expenditure concept 
places into doubt efforts to incorporate tax expenditures into the performance review 
process. Without performance information, Congress will have little basis on which 
to evaluate the effectiveness of tax incentives adopted in furtherance of domestic 
policy goals. If so, discretionary spending programs will be subject to much higher 
standards of review than tax-based incentive programs. That may, in turn, lead 
policy entrepreneurs to favor tax incentive programs, fostering increased 
privatization through the use of tax incentives. 
Nevertheless, such a two-tiered system would be inconsistent with the 
Administration’s reform rhetoric about making government accountable for 
“results.” Without a comparable means of evaluating tax-delivered incentives, tax 
incentives will be given a “free ride” from accountability. Failure to apply 
performance review requirements on the very type of market-based, decentralized 
programs that justify the adoption of performance-based standards presents a 
challenge to the stated rationale for the requirements—that of increasing the 
effectiveness of government programs and expenditures. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress coordinates its taxing and spending decisions through the budget 
process, collectively determining what will be financed and performed through 
government and what will be left to private choice. As the public sector shifts from 
centralized, hierarchical public administration models to alternatives based on 
decentralization, devolution, and privatization, increased attention should be paid to 
the financing dimension of privatization decisions. 
General tax reduction results in more individual financing, which when 
combined with decreased government spending and private sector performance, 
leads to a smaller sphere of government action. By contrast, government contracting, 
outsourcing, and voucher programs retain collective financing but delegate 
performance to the private sector. Like government contracting, outsourcing, or 
vouchers, targeted tax incentives are financed collectively, through higher general 
tax rates (or higher borrowing costs) and involve legislative choices about the use of 
public resources. Unlike vouchers, which are funded through appropriations, 
targeted tax incentives rely on private market responses to altered price levels for 
tax-favored activities. 
 
300 BUDGET, FY 2005, supra note 144, at 9. 
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The Bush Administration’s reconsideration of the tax expenditure budget 
coincided with a crucial time of change in centralized governmental structures. 
During such a period of change, there is a need for more, not less, political 
transparency and accountability. The use of tax incentives can lead to a loss of 
political transparency and accountability, as well as a shift in decision making from 
democratic deliberation about resource allocation to more individualized market 
choices. The governmental funding choices inherent in tax incentive design should 
not be obscured by equating targeted tax incentives with overall tax reduction. 
Tax incentives can be an effective means of delivering government subsidies, 
and accordingly, their use could lead to more cost-effective and minimally intrusive 
government programs. On the other hand, increased use of tax incentives burdens the 
Internal Revenue Service with administrative and enforcement responsibilities for 
subsidy programs outside of its traditional revenue collection function, costs that are 
not always considered when new tax incentives are enacted. 
The difficulty of monitoring the governmental provision of vouchers or tax-
based assistance illustrates the double-edged relationship between individual choice 
and democratic accountability. The legislative decision-making process focuses on 
the financing of the programs and on their initial design. Once in place, these 
programs do not have the same management accountability structures or the 
visibility of programs performed by government agencies. Although vouchers and 
tax benefits may enlarge individual private market choices, they limit democratic 
deliberation and decision making about their effectiveness. In addition, their use may 
paradoxically lead to increased governmental regulation of organizations and private 
firms that participate in such programs. 
Administrative lawyers are engaged in studying new ways in which regulation, 
contracts, and contract monitoring may respond to the accountability problems 
created by increased “contracting out” or privatizing of governmental services. A 
parallel effort to study ways in which increased monitoring of tax credits and 
incentives can be achieved needs to be undertaken. Tax incentives generally do not 
involve negotiated relationships between government and private contractors, but 
typically involve tax reporting to the Internal Revenue Service and oversight 
jurisdiction by the tax-writing committees. The delivery of subsidies through the tax 
system can mask governmental funding levels and allocations and obscure 
accountability for outcomes being funded. Although the first steps in that direction 
have been taken, much more is needed to ensure accountability for such collectively 
financed private choices. 
